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ABSTRACT 
This project’s focus is on the alignment of a U.S. Air Force (USAF) exercise 
design process with FEMA's  challenges regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response (HADR) events. The authors applied Joint Publication 4-10 and Yoder’s Three 
Tier Model  approach to inform a disaster model that delineates roles and responsibilities 
for stakeholders. The authors also reviewed 104 after-action reports to identify trends 
within FEMA’s 15 emergency support functions and added three more categories 
to capture trends: finance, manpower, and training. This research resulted in 
six recommendations to the USAF contracting exercise designers: 1) ensure that 
exercise frameworks are aligned to the lead agency; 2) consolidate the many advance 
contracts throughout the federal agencies into one location such as Acquisition 
Gateway or GSA Advantage, or on a SharePoint site; 3) continue adopting category 
management practices within the disaster environment in order to effectively 
implement advance contracts; 4) further refine the career field education training plan 
with tiered development under a synthesized HADR framework; 5) consolidate the 
federal external stakeholders into a simplified location to improve the ability to research 
trends within the USAF contracting career field; and 6) ask other federal agencies for 
their approaches while de-conflicting procurement strategies. 
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A well-designed tabletop exercise (TTX) can prepare people and organizations to 
respond efficiently and effectively to disasters. This Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) project addresses improvements to the United States Air Force (USAF) and 
Department of Defense (DOD) TTX for the contracting career field in order to plan, 
prepare, mitigate, and recover from humanitarian assistance disaster response (HADR) 
within the continental United States (CONUS) effectively, efficiently, and holistically. 
This chapter introduces the reader to the background, objectives, research questions, 
assumptions and limitations, scope, methodology, benefits, terminology, and organization 
of this project. By the end of this chapter, the reader should understand the purpose and 
scope of this project. 
A. BACKGROUND 
When a natural disaster strikes, no one can predict how much damage will occur. 
To make matters worse, there are an increasing number of examples of hurricanes going 
from Category 3 to Category 5 with only three or four days’ notice (Berg, Pasch, & Penny, 
2017; Stewart, 2017; Berg, Cangialosi, & Latto, 2018; Avila, Berg, & Hagen, 2019; Berg, 
Beven, & Hagen, 2019), and numerous instances of multiple disasters hitting 
simultaneously as recently as 2017 with hurricanes and wildfires (DHS, 2020a). When 
these incidents happen, countless federal agencies are deployed to assist in remedying the 
damages. The use of the military has increased, with many disasters having at least 25% of 
the expenditures attributed to the Department of Defense (DOD; General Services 
Administration [GSA], 2020). Within the DOD’s contracting career field, these disaster 
response members are labeled contingency contracting officers (CCOs). The CCO’s job is 
quite simple: acquire the supplies and services needed to support their agency’s mission. 
But what is the agency’s mission? Is it isolated to the member’s base, or does it expand 
past the base’s fence line? Understanding the whole mission relies on the CCO’s ability to 
expand their tool set while identifying who to contact to realize the potentially more 
extensive mission set. The base is subordinate to the Air Force Installation Contracting 
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Center (AFICC), which is subordinate to United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) during a disaster. USNORTHCOM works with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), meaning the future mission-focused business leaders of the 
USAF need to know how to work in a joint environment and with other federal agencies 
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2016d, 2017; Holt, 2019). This project is 
designed to improve the USAF base-level preparation to meet the future challenges of 
HADR events within the CONUS. 
Focusing on the USAF, each unit/squadron’s annual requirement is to complete 
contingency contracting training. These trainings are developed by a flight located at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), OH. This flight has pushed significant changes to 
the contingency contracting training, from the creation of the Pacific Command (PACOM) 
TTX in 2018 to a new, user-friendly SharePoint site with myriad tools, procedures, 
policies, and information applicable to contingency. Hurricane Michael hit in 2017 and 
destroyed Tyndall AFB, FL; this event reinforced the USAF’s need to address gaps in their 
contracting force training for HADR events. Although the USAF may be tempted to focus 
purely on the mitigation, prevention, preparedness, and recovery of their base, we assert 
that the USAF should incorporate all stakeholders in their planning, especially regarding 
supply chain management and mission alignment. This assertion is supported in Chapter 
IV, Section D. Fortuitously, in 2019–2020, training is being revamped, and new templates 
and objectives are being developed for the USAF. Because AFBs are located around the 
world, not all objectives and situations will be the same, and each trainer and commander 
at the respective locations will alter the objectives to fit their missions (Fedrigo, 2020; 
Spencer, 2014). 
From 2017 through 2019, Hurricane Michael destroyed Tyndall AFB (Lock, 2019), 
flooding at Offutt AFB caused half of the runway to become nonexistent (Losey, 2019), 
and tornadoes at Wright-Patterson AFB ruined military families’ homes (Axelrod, 2019). 
This project is primarily focused on the USAF’s role in CONUS contingencies. It 
incorporates other stakeholders within that focus to minimize internal competition and 
improve the USAF’s ability to succeed at its mission while not hindering others. Past after 
action reports (AARs) inform the analysis, as well as Government Accountability Office 
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(GAO) reports and objectives identified within multiple USAF tools. The researchers also 
incorporate Yoder’s (2004) Three-Tier Model approach to contingencies to identify the 
different levels of knowledge, skills, abilities, and expectations for each USAF contracting 
participant. Finally, the authors examine the issues that have plagued the federal 
government in CONUS HADR deployments to develop a training model that attempts to 
minimize the chance of repeating past mistakes of the USAF and other agencies and 
organizations.  
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
This project’s main objective is to provide guidance and an updated framework for 
the next CONUS HADR TTX design for the AFICC contingency contracting cell to train 
USAF contracting personnel. The researchers analyze multiple federal organization 
responses to natural disasters from 2005 through 2020, ranging from 2015’s Hurricane 
Katrina to California wildfires throughout the years. Through the lessons learned during 
that analysis and through the recommendations found in AARs and GAO reports, the 
authors seek to improve the USAF training process to avoid repeating past failures and to 
improve the CCO’s preparation for a HADR event within CONUS. The authors incorporate 
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) approach to disaster management to align 
the USAF’s approach within the DOD to the lead agency in a CONUS disaster (Air Force 
Civil Engineer Center [AFCEC], 2018; DHS, 2017). The authors also review how the DOD 
designs training and identifies task objectives and agency missions, and how the USAF 
contracting career field identifies the knowledge, skills, and ability levels within its ranks. 
The authors attempt to align the joint and mission-focused business leader approach that 
has been highlighted in General Cameron Holt’s (2019) Air Force Contracting Flight Plan 
as Line of Effort 4: Expeditionary Contracting as a Joint Force Capability (Holt, 2019, p. 
7) into their recommended future design as well. To match tactics with strategy, future 
exercise development will require more holistic approaches, including identifying all 
federal and state government entities to identify the overarching government mission and 
align the USAF’s actions into that umbrella (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008). As Burkle et al. 
(2017) concluded in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the 
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military is now a critical member within disasters, and, as such, must learn how to work 
with their civilian counterparts to maximize everyone’s effectiveness in disaster recovery. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is, “What are the key recommendations for the next 
USAF contracting career field design in its next CONUS HADR TTX?” This project’s 
secondary questions are as follows: 
• How do the federal government’s multiple disaster frameworks align? 
How should the USAF contracting career field design its next CONUS 
HADR? 
• What do the federal and state government AARs identify as common 
discrepancies, and can requirements and task objectives be incorporated to 
reduce the trends? 
• How can the USAF use its current toolbox (training plans and task lists) to 
identify the necessary skill set in a CONUS HADR event, thereby 
enabling its members to better train and educate themselves in preparation 
for future events? 
• Which stakeholders should be taken into consideration during a CONUS 
HADR event?  
• What exercise objectives should be prioritized?  
D. ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SCOPE 
The authors’ first assumption in this project is that the reader has a basic knowledge 
of CCO functions and of the USAF and DOD contracting processes, rules, and regulations, 
which include the information located in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 
the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The 
authors assume that the training member has completed at least one training exercise 
mandated by the Management Internal Control Toolkit (MICT) if in the USAF. Finally, 
5 
the authors assume that the reader understands that contracting rules and regulations are 
changing every year, requiring the reader to know that the exercise developed is a 
framework adapted to fit their mission. 
The authors’ main limitation in this project was getting the best information from 
the AARs and publicly available GAO reports. AARs are supposed to be written after every 
deployment, but there is no available centralized database with all the AARs in one 
location. The information used in this project ranges from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to the 
Offutt flooding in 2019. Finally, all knowledge from the authors is from a USAF point of 
view. The information from other federal organizations (e.g., FEMA) is not given as 
firsthand knowledge but is based on available researched information.  
The scope of this project, as explained in Chapter III, is limited to hurricane-based 
CONUS HADR events, similar to Hurricane Michael. This project is shared from a USAF 
perspective. All federal organizations are looked at through different perspectives 
regarding past natural disasters; the authors try to identify those perspectives through a 
stakeholder analysis to the supposition that the USAF’s primary concern is the base’s 
recovery. The authors assume that the upcoming changes to the enlisted contracting career 
field education training plan (CFETP) are not drastically different than the current 
iterations of the officer and civilian CFETPs, as they were recently updated. Finally, the 
authors limit the recommendations to the chain of command within a CONUS HADR 
event, namely, FEMA, USNORTHCOM, and the USAF contracting personnel (DHS, 
2017).  
E. PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
The researchers synthesize FEMA’s (2020b) Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP), published in January 2020, and the Joint Training Manual 
for the Armed Forces of the United States (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2015), which was 
published on April 20, 2015 to promote an exercise design that emulates the environmental 
chain of command. The project methodology includes a qualitative analysis of 104 AARs 
and GAO reports from different governmental organizations and actors within a disaster 
environment context. Finally, different frameworks like the National Planning System 
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(DHS, 2016d), the National Planning Frameworks (DHS, 2020q), and Yoder’s Three-Tier 
Model (YTTM; Yoder, 2004) were intertwined into the exercise design recommendations 
to train the future CCOs in a more holistic method that mitigates agency ignorance of the 
overall or competing missions within the government. This ignorance is attributed to 
stovepiping, wherein different subgroups are designed independently of each other despite 
all the subgroups belonging to the same group (e.g., USAF, United States Army [USA], 
FEMA, and USNORTHCOM all falling within the federal government). 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This project promotes a holistic approach to CONUS HADR disasters to help the 
USAF achieve its mission while minimizing negative impacts on other government 
agencies and potentially providing an invaluable resource to the USAF’s mission partners. 
The most significant impact of a well-designed TTX is reducing the unknowns within the 
TTX’s incorporated training environment (i.e., a disaster event within CONUS). CCOs that 
deploy to natural disaster HADR events may enter into a confused and chaotic setting. This 
suggested TTX design is intended to mitigate that chaos through an emphasis on advance 
contracts and an understanding of the potential government agencies competing for 
resources (Mak, 2018a). This project attempts to be an invaluable tool for new and veteran 
CCOs. This project’s analysis aims to improve the CCO’s ability to maximize the utility 
of their actions by incorporating the effects on the whole community while responsibly 
spending taxpayer money. The benefit of understanding who the different federal 
organizations are and what they do can help accurately guide those deployed in fulfilling 
their roles and responsibilities. This knowledge can help develop new federal training and 
procedures that evolve everyone’s abilities to approach a CONUS HADR event as a 
government team instead of various teams competing to meet each of their separate 
missions (Dodaro, 2011).  
G. TERMINOLOGY 
The authors assume that the reader has the necessary knowledge in government 
contracting terms. Many of these terms can be in the FAR Part 2. Any terms not defined 
within FAR Part 2 or the cited document are defined within the section itself. 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
In this chapter, the reader is provided with an introduction to this project’s intent, 
an overview of the complexity of the problems with and solutions to a TTX, and an outline 
of how this project is organized. Chapter II consists of a literature review of the historical 
issues that have plagued contingency contracting in the federal government during natural 
disasters. The chapter also contains a review of exercise design frameworks; disaster phase 
frameworks; government policies, procedures, and laws; and the stakeholders that inform 
how to improve an exercise’s development. Chapter III dives deeper into the authors’ 
methodology to determine how to formulate the TTX’s task objectives, requirements, and 
overall design. In Chapter IV, the researchers analyze past issues in the various reports, 
which helps inform how to build a more vigorous exercise to address as many high 
priorities and recurring issues as possible. The basic requirements of a CONUS HADR 
event are also presented. In Chapter V, the authors conclude their findings and provide 
recommendations for going forward with helping to further the USAF’s CCO CONUS 
HADR program. Appendix A is a sample synthesized USAF CFETP specifically geared 
towards CONUS HADR events. Appendix B is a sample synthesized USAF Universal 
Joint Task List (UJTL) for a CONUS HADR event. Appendix C is an example fill-in sheet 
intended to align the base’s priorities per Emergency Management’s Air Force Manual 
(AFMAN) 10–2502 to FEMA’s annexes. This facilitates the alignment of the emergency 
support functions (ESF) of the subordinate agency, USAF, to the lead agency, FEMA. 
Furthermore, the method includes identifying FEMA’s delegable tasks to the DOD in order 
for the subordinate agencies, such as the USAF, to appropriately plan prior to delegation. 
Appendix D includes the time line for Hurricane Michael per the GSA (2020) and the time 
line of contract actions during this event. Last, Appendix E is a suggested TTX design to 
prepare for a USAF CONUS HADR event. This MBA project also has supplemental files 
available upon request from the Calhoun Library. The supplemental files include  
• a TTX based on Appendix E: USAF CONUS HADR TTX Design for 
Contracting; 
• worksheets to use with the TTX, including the 
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• After Action Report Sample, 
• Gap Analysis Tool (Block 6), 
• Market Research Advance Contract (MRAC) Tool (Block 3, 4),  
• Stakeholder List Assessment (SLA) Tool (Block 1, 2); 
• an Excel version of Appendix A: Synthesized USAF Contracting CFETP 
for a CONUS HADR Event. 
  
9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To create the desired TTX, the authors prioritize understanding the whole 
environment in a HADR event. This chapter includes identifying potential stakeholders 
that may be involved, providing their definitions of a disaster, and outlining the existing 
policies and procedures that must follow. After defining the environment, the authors apply 
the lessons learned from the multitude of disasters over the past 20-plus years to improve 
the defined environment in future exercises. Finally, the authors incorporate those lessons 
learned into the DOD’s and the USAF’s desired learning objectives and into the federal 
government’s lead agency in disasters: FEMA, a non-DOD agency. This knowledge helps 
create a meaningful exercise that can evolve and benefit all parties involved, such as top 
leadership, trainers, and trainees with a wide range of experience levels. Learning from 
government actors’ past experiences helps develop all federal agents’ desired skill sets, 
ranging from the new Airman to the 20-year lieutenant colonel.  
A. ABOUT DISASTERS 
In this section, the authors review multiple sources focused on disaster management 
to capture the different definitions and sources of the word disaster. Also, the authors look 
at other words that are synonymous or connected to disaster. The authors then look at how 
many times the U.S. government has declared a natural disaster to provide an 
understanding of the frequency and importance of preparedness. This information gives a 
better grasp of which disasters the USAF should prioritize to better train its Airmen when 
a natural disaster strikes. 
As a simple Google search reveals, there are countless definitions of the word 
disaster. Therefore, it is essential to explain what the authors mean by disaster and why the 
classification matters. A contracting officer or administrator must know what constitutes a 
disaster, as not all tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and rainy days are equivalent. That 
difference impacts the applicable rules and regulations for the contracting team. The Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, 2019) is the 
overarching act that provides the federal government authority to step in to help states in 
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times of emergency. Section D of this chapter further explains the Stafford Act’s (2019) 
definitions of emergency and major disaster.  
“Emergency” means any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement 
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property 
and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe 
in any part of the United States. (Stafford Act, 2019, p. 11) 
“Major disaster” means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, 
tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), 
or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the 
United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage 
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance 
under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, 
local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the 
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (Stafford Act, 2019, p. 
11) 
The FAR’s definition of an emergency is as follows:  
“Emergency,” as used in 6.208, 13.201, 13.500, 18.001, 18.202, 18.203, and 
subpart 26.2, means any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement 
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property 
and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe 
in any part of the United States (42 U.S.C. 5122). (FAR 2.101, 2020) 
The other word that is important in regard to disasters is contingency. The FAR 
defines contingency operation as follows: 
“Contingency operation” means a military operation that … results in the 
call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed 
services under section 688, 12301 (a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 
12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, section 712 of title 14, or any 
other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared 
by the President or Congress. (FAR 2.101, 2020) 
FEMA’s database, Disaster Declaration Summaries, Version 2, has a 
comprehensive list of all U. S. natural disaster declarations from 1953 to 2020 (DHS, 
2020a). There were 42,095 declared disasters between January 1990 and May 2020, with 
an average of 1,432 nonbiological/nonchemical disaster declarations per year. The year 
2020 is not included in the mean, as the data only accounts for less than half a year. With 
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Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 2020 is on track to increase the average or become 
an outlier—like 2004—as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 provides a visualization of state 
disaster declarations per year and depicts a steady increase in declared disasters between 
1965 and 2019 (DHS, 2020a).  
 
Figure 1. The Number of Disaster Declarations per Year. Adapted from 
DHS (2020a).  
The majority (64%) of disasters declared from 1953 to May 2020 have been water-
related (severe storms, hurricanes, and floods), while the fourth most declared disaster type 
is classified as biological; however it is primarily the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019–2020 
(DHS, 2020a; see Figure 2). COVID-19 is not in this project’s scope; however, it does 
provide an excellent opportunity for further research. The authors encourage designing an 
exercise focused on a hurricane or a water-based event because of this data. The “other” 
category comprises only 1% of total disasters. It includes relatively rarer events such as 
earthquakes, typhoons, volcanic eruptions, fishing losses, landslides, the release of toxic 
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Storm(s) 16625 32.87% 32.87% 
Hurricane 10834 21.42% 54.29% 
Flood 10327 20.42% 74.71% 
Snow 3659 7.23% 81.94% 
Fire 3302 6.53% 88.47% 
Severe Ice 
Storm 1990 3.93% 92.40% 
Tornado 1445 2.86% 95.26% 
Drought 1292 2.55% 97.82% 
Coastal Storm 507 1.00% 98.82% 
Freezing 301 0.60% 99.41% 
Other 297 0.59% 100.00% 
Grand Total 50579 100.00% N/A 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Total Disaster Declarations by Disaster Type. 
Adapted from DHS (2020a). 
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With the data shown in Figure 2 and Table 1, the authors recommend HADR 
exercises centered around a hurricane event that incorporates flooding events as well. The 
authors also reviewed other emergencies, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, to see if there 
are lessons incorporated into the exercise but in a hurricane-centric manner. An example 
of a unique earthquake requirement is damage to underground pipes. Although unlikely in 
a hurricane, airfield repair could potentially damage underground pipes if inaccurate maps 
are consulted. 
Understanding how the Stafford Act (2019) and the FAR Part 2 (2020) define a 
disaster helps inform the desired environment regarding applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations. Analyzing the history of federally declared natural disasters provides a context 
for what the United States might expect to occur in the future. While there are outliers like 
COVID-19, the government can still use examples and behaviors from the past to inform 
the future. Creating an exercise based on this analysis helps the USAF prepare for future 
natural disasters that are most likely to occur annually. This TTX will hopefully be a 
framework for other services and agencies to expand upon for future endeavors.  
B. PHASES OF A DISASTER 
In this section, multiple models are addressed to analyze how different agencies 
respond to disasters and what sources and frameworks they utilize. Unfortunately, federal 
agencies do not respond identically to natural disasters which is exemplified by the multiple 
frameworks that exist. Identifying the similarities and differences between the agencies’ 
approaches in this analysis can help develop a training exercise for the USAF that alleviates 
the communication barriers between other federal government agencies due to these 
differences.  
Multiple models provide a phased-approach disaster management framework. As 
this MBA project’s primary focus is to create a USAF TTX that may interface with sister 
services as well as FEMA, it is vital to speak the different organizational languages within 
the federal government. After reviewing the DOD’s framework, FEMA’s framework, and 
the YTTM framework, the different framework phases can be broken into three time 
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frames—pre-disaster, disaster, and post-disaster—which in this report is referred to as the 
three-phase approach. 
 DOD Disaster Framework 
The 2019 Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, Operational Contract Support, references JP 
3-0, Joint Operations (JCS, 2018) and identifies six phases to an operation: “shape, deter, 
seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority” (JCS, 2019b, p. 33). 
Unfortunately, these phases are designed for wartime contingencies. Fortunately, the JP 
4-10 phases of an operation and FEMA’s phases of a disaster connect in a relatively 
synonymous way. Pre-disaster phases of operations would be labeled under the shape and 
deter phases. The shape phase “help [s] set conditions for successful theater operations. 
Shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence 
actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional 
stability” (JCS, 2019b, p. 34). The deter phase is “characterized by preparatory actions that 
indicate the intent or ability to execute subsequent combat operations. This includes 
contracted support to deterrence activities … but contracting support is often limited due 
to fiscal constraints, lack of emergency procurement authority flexibilities, and the urgent 
nature of deterrence missions” (JCS, 2019b, p. 34). 
These two phases are critical for the preparation before the disaster occurs. In these 
two phases, the JCS provides the guidance and directives needed when a disaster happens. 
These two phases are critical in enabling the DOD stakeholders so they can identify the 
internal capabilities and tools necessary in a HADR event and the deficiencies that need to 
be addressed organically (i.e., through training) or nonorganically (i.e., through 
procurement), so there are fewer surprises. The more an organization knows before a 
disaster hits, the easier it is to manage and predict the following four stages. 
The seize the initiative and dominate phases take place during a disaster. The seize 
the initiative phase is described as 
focus [ing] on applying force to gain access to the operational area and 
expand friendly freedom of action. Military actions during this time period 
are characterized by an extremely high operating tempo and freedom of 
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action of maneuvering forces and their supporting organizations. (JCS, 
2019b, p. 34) 
The dominate phase  
focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in non-combat situations, 
to control the [operational environment]. … Contracting personnel and 
CAAF will continue to arrive, though not necessarily at a rate 
commensurate with the number of troops to be supported” (JCS, 2019b, pp. 
34–35).  
These two phases are crucial during a disaster because the organizations get the first 
glimpse of what recovery may entail. Controlling the environment and knowing what 
essential mission personnel is needed leads to a smoother transition from the disaster phase 
to the post-disaster phase. 
The stabilize phase occurs both during and after a disaster occurs. The enable civil 
authority phase is post-disaster. During the stabilizing phase, the organizations shift from 
direct support to empowering the community affected to sustain itself, including a shift to 
infrastructure projects and nonforce support. The enable civil authority phase is 
“predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance, along 
with a reduction in the deployed U.S. military and CAAF footprint” (JCS, 2019b, p. 35). 
These two phases help transition from government intervention to local normalcy wherever 
the disaster has impacted. These two phases are only practical if the four preceding JP 4-10 
phases, captured in the pre-disaster and disaster stages of the three-phase approach, 
appropriately set up the affected area to transition. There will always be unknowns or 
surprises, because no two natural disasters are the same; however, the JP 4-10 six-phase 
approach improves the probability of success.  
 USAF Disaster Framework 
The 2018 AFMAN 10–2502, Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) 
Standards and Procedures (AFCEC, 2018), referenced in the emergency management 
career field’s Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10–2501, Emergency Management Program 
(AFCEC, 2020), identifies four phases of a disaster in sequential order: prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery, with a fifth background phase of mitigation as an 
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ongoing process, which closely emulates FEMA’s framework (AFCEC, 2018). The first of 
the four phases, prevention, includes “proliferation prevention, fire prevention, disease 
prevention, and contamination prevention” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 5). Prevention, in this 
context, is the “actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from 
occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 
33). Prevention uses gathered information and intelligence to try and stop what might 
occur. Some incidents are unavoidable, but mitigating preventable events, such as 
preventing flooding by investing in sandbags at the front end or delineating the chain of 
command to reduce communication problems, will set up the organization for success 
during and after a disaster.  
The second phase identified in AFMAN 10–2502 is protection and consists of 
“actions necessary to secure installations and personnel against acts of terrorism and 
manmade or natural disasters” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 5). It is vital to separate force protection          
and protection in a disaster. Force protection does not “protect against accidents, weather, 
or disease” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 30). Protection, in this context, is “an integrated application 
of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, pre-empt, mitigate, or negate threats 
against or hazards to USAF air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable 
level of risk” (AFCEC, 2018, pp. 30–31). Examples of protection actions are protecting 
military equipment or assets from flooding and wind damage by moving them inside and 
hardening warehouses against hurricane-level winds. One real-world example occurred 
when, before Hurricane Michael hit, the military aircraft at Tyndall AFB were flown to a 
different location to protect them from damage (Losey, 2018).  
The third phase identified in AFMAN 10–2502 is the response, which consists of 
“actions taken during an incident which could include deploying the Disaster Response 
Force [DRF], implementing response plans and checklists, and initiating the installation 
notification and warning system” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 5). The actions in the response phase 
are directly impacted by the activities that occur in the first phase, prevention. Response 
examples include “sav [ing] lives, protect [ing] property, and meet [ing] basic human 
needs” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 34).  
The fourth phase is recovery, which consists of 
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operations such as implementing casualty treatment, rendering unexploded 
ordnance safe, personnel and resource decontamination, airfield damage, 
repair and facility restoration. Recovery planning and actions begin as soon 
as possible to ensure sustainment of crucial missions and restoration of 
normal operations. (AFCEC, 2018, p. 5) 
When the natural disaster or any other incident has passed, the USAF team, per 
AFMAN 10–2502’s guidance, will assess and determine what actions will be taken for the 
“development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for 
impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services 
through individual, private sector, non-governmental, and public assistance programs” 
(AFCEC, 2018, p. 33). For example, after Hurricane Michael hit Tyndall AFB, the USAF 
estimated the repair costs to the base at $3 billion, including repair and hardening efforts 
to mitigate future storm surges (Allen, 2019). This leads to the next identified phase.  
The fifth phase identified in AFMAN 10–2502 is mitigation. According to AFMAN 
10–2502, mitigation is an “ongoing process and is considered, to some degree, a part of 
every phase of incident management” (AFCEC, 2018, p. 5). Mitigation is kept separate 
from the other four phases in the manual due to the unique holistic approach (i.e., no time-
bound aspect). The purpose of mitigation is to reduce the risk and impact of an incident.  
These phases play an essential role in the USAF standards and how the USAF 
secures its operations. This four-phase-plus-one approach is similar to the other 
frameworks within the government’s purview. By defining each organization’s phases and 
approaches, the authors hope to create a Rosetta stone for the different federal frameworks 
that the USAF may run into in a disaster environment.  
 FEMA’s Disaster Framework 
FEMA has five different mission frameworks that fall underneath the National 
Planning Frameworks’ umbrella label (DHS, 2020q). They are the National Prevention 
Framework, the National Protection Framework, the National Mitigation Framework, the 
National Response Framework, and the National Disaster Recovery Framework. All of 
these frameworks are part of the National Preparedness System. There are six parts to the 
National Preparedness System, including assessing and identifying risk, estimating 
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capability requirements, building and sustaining those capabilities, planning to deliver the 
capabilities, validating the capabilities, and reviewing and updating the system. This 
system is incorporated within Chapter III, as it is quite similar to the DOD’s JP 5-0 Joint 
Planning instruction (JCS, 2017), as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Manual (CJCSM) 3500.03E: Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United 
States (JCS, 2015).  
The first framework within the National Planning System is the 2nd edition 
National Prevention Framework, published in June 2016 (DHS, 2016e). This framework 
applies before the disaster and identifies what a community “should do upon the discovery 
of an imminent terrorist threat to the homeland” (DHS, 2016e, p. 1). Interestingly, the 
prevention framework does not detail natural disasters; however, by replacing the word 
terrorist threat with natural disaster, the framework is quite similar to the other federal 
frameworks. Unfortunately, there isn’t an available method of preventing hurricanes or 
storms. This is why the next four frameworks are considered more important in the case of 
natural disasters. 
The second framework within the National Planning Framework is the 2nd edition 
National Protection Framework published in June 2016 (DHS, 2016f). This framework 
occurs before a disaster happens and entails informing the community what they “should 
do to safeguard against acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other threats or hazards” 
(DHS, 2016f, p. 1). The prevention framework is activated upon the first sign of disaster. 
For example, the weather radar predicts when a hurricane will hit land and at what speed. 
This framework covers communication, roles and responsibilities among the different 
stakeholders, capabilities and task goals within a protection mindset, how the framework 
relates to the other frameworks, and how to apply it.  
The third framework within the National Planning Framework is the 2nd edition 
National Mitigation Framework, published in June 2016 (DHS, 2016c). This framework 
occurs before the disaster occurs and “establishes a common platform and forum for 
coordinating and addressing how the Nation manages risk using mitigation capabilities and 
describes mitigation roles across the whole community” (DHS, 2016c, p. 1). In this 
framework, FEMA’s goal is to reduce property damage and minimize loss of life. The 
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prevention, protection, and mitigation frameworks integrate before the disaster to prevent 
or reduce the disaster’s impact on people, property, and overall society during and after the 
disaster.  
The fourth mission framework within the National Planning Framework is the 4th 
edition National Response Framework, published in October 2019 (DHS, 2019b). This 
framework is the most recently updated. The update expands its “principles and concepts 
to better integrate government and private sector response efforts” (DHS, 2019b, p. 1). It 
cannot be understated how important the integration of all stakeholders in disaster 
management is to respond effectively to a disaster, whether it be through search and rescue 
(SAR) missions, supply chain management and sourcing, or de-conflicting duplicative or 
competing efforts.  
The last mission framework within the National Planning Framework is the 2nd 
edition National Disaster Recovery Framework (DHS, 2016a), published in June 2016. 
This framework emphasizes that all entities, at all levels of the government and community, 
need to “collaborate and coordinate to more effectively utilize existing resources to 
promote resilience and support the recovery of those affected by an incident” (DHS, 2016d, 
p. 1). This framework also focuses on “how to restore, redevelop, and revitalize the health, 
social, economic, natural and environmental fabric of the community” (DHS, 2020f, p. 1) 
Arguably, each framework can be applied to the three-phase approach, as shown in 
Figure 3, where FEMA provides an ongoing preparation until the disaster occurs, leading 
to the appropriate response over different time frames. A caveat to this approach is that 
through feedback systems each of these frameworks are technically constantly active. For 
example the mitigation framework is designed to be active prior to disaster; however, 
during and after a disaster occur, additional mitigation strategies may be implemented or 
attempted which should inform future pre-disaster mitigation strategies.  
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Figure 3. FEMA’s Recovery Continuum. Source: DHS (2016d, p. 11). 
 Yoder’s Three-Tier Model Framework  
According to YTTM, there are four phases to a disaster or emergency, with an 
implied Phase 0 for planning for those four phases. Phase 1 is mobilization and initial 
deployment, which leads to the second phase of build-up and stabilization. Phase 3 
transitions to sustainment, which ends in Phase 4’s termination and redeployment. The 
three tiers in the model are the Ordering Officer Model (OOM), the Leveraging Contracting 
Officer (LCO) Model, and the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model. The OOM 
describes the contracting officers who order the different agencies and communities in the 
contingency environment. The LCO Model is a more complex version of the OOM in that 
it takes into account regional and geographical tendencies to order what is required. The 
IPE Model describes the big picture of why the contracting officer is buying for that region. 
This model can achieve what the National Security Strategy (NSS) set forth to do. These 
tiers correlate with Table 2, which lists the actions that occur during each phase to provide 
further clarification.  
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Table 2. Requirements by YTTM Phase. Source: Yoder (2004). 
 
 
There is additional literature on the YTTM by Lawson and Cashwell (2018), who 
analyzed YTTM for precontract award applications. The authors incorporated a key 
recommendation throughout this project was integrating JP 4-10 along with the YTTM to 
synergize the multiple federal responses into one overall response. The advantage to using 
the YTTM literature, is that it provides a relatively simple to use system to develop a 
potential or current CCO’s skill set. First the contracting personnel is trained to meet the 
objectives of an OOM, then to the LCO, and finally to the IPE.  
 A Synthesized Three-Phase Approach 
Table 3 synthesizes the above frameworks into the three-phase approach of pre-
disaster, during the disaster, and post-disaster. The purpose is to create a chart that aligns 
the different stakeholder languages and doctrines into a simple-to-use format.  
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Table 3. Three-Phase Approach to a Disaster Exercise  
 
 
Reviewing the different agencies’ publications and processes shows that there are 
different views on disaster phases. These varied thought processes can be alarming. Each 
of these organizations should have the same plan in dealing with natural disasters, 
especially when they are expected to work together to achieve the same goal for the 
American public. Even though different words are used (e.g., prevent, deter, mitigate, 
protect), each of these publications can be easily integrated. The authors developed the 
exercise recommendations to incorporate each of these approaches to maximize the 
USAF’s ability to ensure a holistic approach to their disaster management. 
C. LAWS THAT APPLY WHEN A DISASTER OCCURS 
This section presents the various laws that apply to a disaster and how organizations 
use them in the event of a disaster. The section also covers to whom the laws and 
regulations apply. Although some regulations will be redundant, it is essential to highlight 
the complex regulatory environment involved with a disaster. Knowing the laws and 
regulations keeps the contracting officer from breaking the rules. It also provides them and 
their customers with avenues to request funds or identify and utilize existing tools. 
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 The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2020) 
Regardless of the natural disaster and its impact, nothing can be achieved by the 
federal government’s acquisition actions without funding. It does not matter whether there 
is an emergency; the government cannot purchase goods or services without certified 
funds. However, these certified funds have a specific line of accounting that only certain 
federal agencies can allocate. When a natural disaster occurs, different agencies will be 
involved, and some agencies might not have access to the correct funds or sufficient funds. 
The Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2020)), helps mitigate this issue. The agency 
agreement is as follows: 
The head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may 
place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or 
another agency for goods or services if – (1) amounts are available; (2) the 
head of the ordering agency or unit decides the order is in the best interest 
of the United States Government; (3) the agency or unit to fill the order is 
able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services; and (4) the 
head of the agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided by 
contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise. (Economy 
Act, 2020) 
The Economy Act appears in FAR 17.502-2. However, the FAR applies “when one 
agency uses another agency’s contract to obtain supplies or services. If the interagency 
business transaction does not result in a contract or an order, then the FAR does not apply” 
(FAR 17.502-2, 2020). Fortunately, if this is ever needed, getting it approved is a simple 
process described within the FAR. When natural disasters occur, agencies might not need 
to use this act, but it is available to improve the government’s spending effectiveness. 
 Stafford Act 42 U.S.C. § 5170, 5191 (2020) 
One of the laws that the federal government can activate through the executive 
branch is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 
Act, 2019), which was discussed in Section A of this chapter. The purpose of the Stafford 
Act is “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal government 
to state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering 
and damage which result from such disasters” (Stafford Act, 2019, p. 1). The president 
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needs to declare a natural disaster and activate the Stafford Act’s powers after a governor 
of the state requests assistance. When authorized,  
the funding that supports and resources these efforts comes from the 
Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). This is a “no-year” revolving fund account that 
does not expire from year to year, similar to the Defense Working Capital 
Fund. Congress appropriates funds as needed to keep the account solvent. 
(King & McKay, 2006, p. 74)  
It is essential to note the no-year fund allocation. The contracting officer needs to 
be aware of these funds’ limitations, when available, as compared to operations and 
maintenance funds that would typically be available to a USAF base in a familiar 
environment (which have a 1-year fund allocation).  
 The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1878) 
The Posse Comitatus Act (1878) is another law that can be activated by the 
president when certain conditions exist. This act “outlaws the willful use of any opart of 
the Army or Air Force to execute the law unless expressly authorized by the Constitution 
or an act of Congress” (Elsea, 2018); however, in certain times of need, there are exceptions 
to these prohibitions/limitations which are located in 10 U.S.C. § 271–284 
(USNORTHCOM, 2019a; Elsea, 2018). There are 13 different sections, and they cover 
activities ranging from reimbursement, maintenance and operation of equipment, and use 
of information collected during military operations, to name a few. These different sections 
tie to the various missions that are needed to support the American people. One activity 
that the military might assist with is security services. For example, during Hurricane 
Katrina, military personnel were responsible for providing security to the Superdome “to 
ensure no one entered that area that the Environmental Protection Agency condemned” 
(Greenberger & Spaccarelli, 2010, p. 51). This act allows the DOD to provide security in 
very few cases—for example, in the presence of hazards to the local populace and on rare 
instances where the state enforcement agencies are considered insufficient. If called upon, 
the contracting officer will need to understand the limitations of contracting inherently 
governmental functions per FAR 7.5, Inherently Governmental Functions (2020). 
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 The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and the Air Force 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) 
When a natural disaster occurs, it is not a guarantee that the president will declare 
a contingency. There are locations worldwide to which service members deploy that are 
not considered a declared contingency operation because neither Congress nor the U.S. 
president has made a formal declaration. While contingency operations differ between 
CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS), the rhetoric does not 
change. For example, when construction first started at Air Base (AB) 201 Agadez, Niger 
in 2016, the location was not labeled a declared contingency. Because of this, all rules, 
regulations, and dollar thresholds were the same as contracting actions and awards 
stateside. For a contingency operation to be declared, military members contribute to 
“military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or an 
opposing military force: or during other provisions of law during war or during a national 
emergency declared by the President or Congress” (Military Support for Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 1956, p. 1). Overall, there are multiple plans, actions, and targets 
for different scenarios that correlate with the military’s various branches. The reasoning 
for this is that each branch has their own mission set forth by the Pentagon. 
Three different federal acquisition regulations that govern the USAF are the FAR, 
the DFARS, and the AFFARS. When looking at the FAR for contingency operations, the 
regulations provide five different title sections: the definition within FAR 2.101 (2020), 
the micro-purchase threshold, the simplified acquisition threshold, the Standard Form (SF) 
44, and the simplified procedures for certain commercial items. These simplified 
procedures for commercial items are in FAR 13.500 (2020). The regulations in Part 13 
guide the contracting officer through commercial acquisition methods that do not exceed 
$250,000, which is the simplified acquisition threshold; however, when natural disasters 
occur, the dollar amount can increase to $13 million.  
The DFARS provides a more direct look at the rules and regulations of defense 
federal contracting, as it is the DOD’s supplement to the FAR. When dissecting the 
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language in DFARS 218.201 (2020), Contingency Operations, more in-depth processes are 
given that align with different methods of purchasing within the following 12 topics: 
• selection, appointment, and termination of appointment 
• policy for unique item identification 
• use of the government-wide commercial purchase card 
• government commercial purchase card 
• imprest funds and third party drafts 
• SF44 
• only one offer 
• approval of determination and findings for time-and-materials or labor-
hour contracts 
• undefinitized contract actions 
• prohibited sources 
• authorizations acts 
• electronic submissions and processing of payment requests  
Knowing this information is vital to disaster response, because once the disaster is 
declared a contingency operation, the contracting rules change and become more flexible 
in order to meet the mission. For example, having multiple offers helps promote 
competition and shows that the winning bid will be fair and reasonable when soliciting a 
contract. Under contingency operations, however, the contracting officer can receive only 
one offer and still award the contract due to the circumstances. Another example is the 
government purchase card. The limits and the micro-purchase threshold will change due to 
the environment. These are just two examples out of the 12. The contracting team needs to 
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know these changes and be aware of what is available when the environment changes to a 
contingency operation.  
The AFFARS is a set of USAF-specific rules and regulations of federal contracting. 
The information in AFFARS 5318.201 (2020) aligns with the FAR’s rhetoric. Sections in 
this subpart include the micro-purchase threshold, the simplified acquisition threshold, and 
selection, appointment, and termination of appointment. When understanding the 
regulations, it is unfortunate that all services and some agencies have their own guidelines 
to follow. It would make joint contracting, exercises, and deployments easier if the 
regulations were consolidated into a joint supplement. 
Acknowledging the complexity and vastness of the laws, statutes, and regulations, 
the authors attempt to incorporate them into the TTX. It is not only important to 
acknowledge what this subject currently entails; it is imperative to know where to find the 
information and accept that what was true last year may not be true this year, depending 
on administrative changes by the governing agencies.  
D. POTENTIAL STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
This section identifies what the different levels of the government are and 
highlights the responsibilities and roles of the different agencies and offices. There are 
multiple positions in government held by individuals with high-level responsibilities who 
oversee their specialty areas. It is crucial to identify each of these positions and the 
corresponding priorities, as the individuals in charge will intentionally or unintentionally 
compete for the priorities of their organization. This is understandable as it is the 
individual’s job to align to their agency. In this literature review, the authors discuss the 
responsibilities and roles associated with each agency/position and attempt to capture the 
various priorities in the disaster environment.  
In a disaster, there is a multitude of public and private stakeholders. According to 
the National Disaster Recovery Framework, there are more than 600 stakeholders across 
public and private enterprises for recovery alone (DHS, 2016a). The authors conclude that 
the USAF should train with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), FEMA, DOD, and 
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state and local governments in mind during any exercise, using the guidelines stated in the 
DOD’s JP 4-10 (JCS, 2019b) and FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework (DHS, 
2016a). With this information, the organizations may require supplies and services that 
may conflict with the other organizations if appropriate communications and actions do 
not occur. 
The USAF base’s most critical player/section is the emergency management flight, 
which falls under the civil engineering squadron (CES). Emergency management 
personnel are “trained to handle recovery and response operations after natural disasters 
and manmade crises. Their goal is to reduce casualties and help those affected by a disaster 
to reach safety” (Powers, 2019, para. 1). The emergency management flight is 
establishe [d for] Air Force emergency management responsibilities, 
procedures, and standards to physical threats resulting from: major 
accidents; natural disasters; conventional attacks; terrorist attacks; and 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks or incidents. 
It provides a framework for planning and preparedness across the five 
National Incident Management System mission areas: prevention, 
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation; and includes domestic and 
foreign guidance. (AFCEC, 2020, p. 8) 
This responsibility and communication are accomplished at all USAF levels, from 
major command (MAJCOM) to the Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center 
(AFIMSC) level. There are multiple roles and responsibilities for each deputy chief of staff 
to fulfill in order to prepare themselves for any of the listed events. When these natural 
disasters occur, all levels—from the local bases to the MAJCOM—have a form of a 
command and control (C2) center set up to facilitate open communication lines for all 
parties involved. More information on the C2 is in Section F of this chapter. 
Just like in FEMA’s framework and in the AFIMS Standards and Procedures 
(AFCEC, 2018), the five mission areas appear. Fortunately, the USAF Emergency 
Management is aligned to FEMA’s framework (AFCEC, 2018; 2020); however there are 
still minute differences. Prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation are defined the 
same in both approaches and defined in Section C of this chapter. There is no definition of 
protection in the AFI 10–2501 (AFCEC, 2020). However, it is defined in the AFMAN 10–
2502 (AFCEC, 2018) under Section 3 in this chapter. Furthermore, the definition of 
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protection is not found in either document’s terms section but is only found in the AFIMS 
system overview section in AFMAN 10–2502 (AFCEC, 2018). If the FEMA framework 
and the AFMAN/AFI can define these similar words, communication lines can improve 
between the two federal agencies. 
The hierarchy depicted in Figure 4 should be treated as the primary central hub for 
communications chains, as this hierarchy is the basis for contingency planning for USAF 
bases. The wing commander is in charge of the base, and the emergency management 
function is the wing commander’s program (Air Force Medical Operations Agency 
[AFMOA], 2019; Office of Military Force Management [OMFM], 2019, p. 85). Figure 4 
highlights other vital support organizations on a USAF installation in response to a HADR 
event in red. 
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Figure 4. Air Force Wing Structure. Adapted from AFMOA (2019) and 
OMFM (2019). 
Another critical function that falls under the wing commander’s support staff is 
public affairs. The public affairs function is guided by AFI 35–105, which “implements 
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Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 35–1, Public Affairs Management, and procedures for 
planning and executing community relations and civic outreach programs” (Air Force 
Office of Public Affairs, 2017, p. 1). The comptroller squadron also directly falls under the 
wing staff support agency instead of its own group. This squadron runs the wing’s budget 
and is the initial point of contact for requesting additional funding for the base’s 
requirements. If the Stafford Act (2019) is enacted, this squadron will help allocate funds 
through the current USAF systems (i.e., Defense Enterprise Accounting Management 
System [DEAMS]). If the Stafford Act (2019) is not enacted or if the funding from the act 
is not available to the base, the comptroller squadron will be critical in identifying available 
funds and provide the base funds available to address the disaster.  
The majority of the key players on an Air Force installation fall under the mission 
support group (MSG). The force support squadron (FSS) responsibilities include housing 
assignments, temporary duty orders, dining facilities, and mortuary affairs. CES 
responsibilities include managing roads and facilities, repairing airfields, providing power 
and water, removing debris, as well as maintaining the equipment needed for each of these 
mission sets. The fire department and emergency management functions also fall under the 
CES purview. The communication squadron (CS) runs the land mobile radio (LMR) 
function and the USAF installation’s information technology capabilities. The logistics 
readiness squadron (LRS) responsibilities include planning aircraft flights (called “grey 
tail”) and managing the base’s vehicle program. The security forces squadron (SFS) runs 
base security, including higher priority security requirements for critical facilities and other 
important areas. The contracting squadron (CONS) has the responsibility to acquire 
supplies and services to support all of the previously mentioned functions (AFMOA, 2019). 
When a disaster response occurs, these particular squadrons have considerable input in how 
to complete the mission and whether the mission is feasible or not.  
The medical group’s (MDG) primary point of contact for contracting is the medical 
support squadron’s logistics flight. The logistics flight follows AFMAN 41–209 (AFMOA, 
2019). An essential medical logistics function is the identification and documentation of 
damaged equipment due to natural disasters in order to let commanders and leadership 
positions know what is available after the disaster and which asset acquisition needs to be 
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prioritized to protect the base and the local veteran community. Additionally, this group 
may be relied upon to provide medical support to disaster casualties and integrate with the 
Civil Air Patrol (CAP) mission for SAR, which is identified in the Civil Air Patrol 
Regulation (CAPR) 60–3 (Civil Air Patrol [CAP], 2012).  
CAP, surprisingly, does not garner a lot of attention despite its benefits. Their 
mission statement is “supporting America’s communities with emergency response, 
diverse aviation and ground services, youth development and promotion of air, space, and 
cyber power” (CAP, n.d., p. 1; Saltzman, 2018). CAP is a volunteer force that is an 
auxiliary of the USAF that flies missions to support natural disasters. This all-volunteer 
force fills a beneficial role, especially during a natural disaster. Although the CAP does not 
fall under the installation’s command and control, the CAP is a great asset. CAP can 
“accomplish damage assessment, transport of equipment and supplies, [and] monitoring of 
overall operations” (CAP, 2012, p. 11) and “may provide crash site surveillance and/or 
crowd control duties” (CAP, 2012, p. 16). Even though not all military bases have a CAP 
nearby, it is vital to identify whether this is the case within each TTX to understand the 
operational disaster environment and which assets are available to complete the 
installation’s mission set. From a USAF contracting point of view, AFI 10–2701 (2018) 
defines what types of support may be provided from the USAF which includes aircraft, 
vehicles, computers, communications equipment, and uniforms. 
While the local affected bases may be dealing with their own issues, it is unlikely 
that they are the only stakeholders, let alone bases, affected by a disaster. 
USNORTHCOM’s mission includes addressing disasters within the United States and 
coordinating with FEMA on behalf of the DOD. In response to a disaster, USNORTHCOM 
will create a joint task force made up of useful functions guided by CJSM 3500.03E (JCS, 
2015) and JP 4-10 (JCS, 2019b), which may include some or all of the following: 
manpower (J-1), intelligence (J-2), operations (J-3), logistics (J-4), cyber (J-6), 
engineering, staff judge advocates, comptrollers (J-8), and public affairs (JCS, 2019b). 
AFICC falls underneath the J-4 logistics function umbrella, which would be the local 
base’s point of contact for requirements fulfillment (JCS, 2019b). Although the base-level 
CONS’s main priority will be supporting the base, there may be additional requirements 
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levied on them by USNORTHCOM through AFICC. By understanding the different 
USNORTHCOM and joint functions within the operational contract support (OCS) 
mission, the USAF and AFICC can adapt their preparedness planning to incorporate those 
potential requests to reduce additional confusion or surprise during a disaster. 
If the federal government declares a disaster, FEMA is the lead organization per 
the 4th edition of the National Response Framework (NRF; DHS, 2019b). FEMA is broken 
up into 10 different regions, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. FEMA Regions. Source: FEMA (2020b). 
During a disaster, the NRF provides a unified coordination chart (see Figure 6) as 
well as the roles and responsibilities allocated to each section. The joint task force 
commander/liaison is the bridge to FEMA’s unified coordination group, including a 
defense coordinating officer (DHS, 2019b).  
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Figure 6. FEMA’s Unified Coordination Staff. Source: DHS (2019b). 
Per the National Disaster Recovery Framework, each regional office has multiple 
points of contact that are useful in planning and preparing for disasters (DHS, 2016a). Each 
regional office may be staffed slightly differently due to hiring and funding; the authors 
believe that each TTX should encourage identifying each of these points of contact as well 
as their current responsibilities and any upcoming exercises that the local base participates 
in.  
The National Disaster Recovery Framework provides two NGO groupings that 
help build a list of local vendors that may be available even in a disaster environment in 
the applicable region or area (DHS, 2016a). The Voluntary Organizations Active in 
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Disaster (VOAD) is a national coalition of organizations that support a community in the 
face of a disaster (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster [NVOAD], n.d.). 
The NVOAD is “a coalition of 70+ of the nation’s most reputable national organizations 
(faith-based, community-based, and other non-profit organizations) and 56 State/Territory 
VOADs, which represent Local/Regional VOADs and hundreds of other member 
organizations throughout the country” (DHS, 2016c). While there are different agencies in 
the NVOAD that are available to help the community in a time of need, some of their 
specializations are not in natural disasters. Knowing this emphasizes the importance of 
identifying the companies that can or cannot help, depending on the emergency, before 
disaster strikes. The Community Organization Active in Disaster (COAD), unlike the 
NVOAD, is not a national program and may exist only in certain localities—unlike the 
NVOAD, which exists in all states and territories (New Jersey Volunteer Organizations 
Active in Disaster [NJVOAD], 2016). The COAD’s mission is similar to that of the 
NVOAD’s, with the only difference being locality. 
An additional directive given by FEMA is the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS; DHS, 2016b). The purpose of the NIMS is to guide “all levels of 
government, NGO, and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents” (FEMA, 2017, p. 11). One structure used 
by multiple jurisdictions and organizations is called the emergency operations center 
(EOC). The EOC “is a facility from which staff provide information management, resource 
allocation, and tracking, and/or advanced planning support to personnel on the scene or at 
other EOCs” (FEMA, 2017, p. 15). The EOC staff will be different during every natural 
disaster based on the disaster’s impacts and created requirements. However, while various 
organizations will have diverse representation, 
all EOC teams receive oversight from elected and/or appointed officials 
such as governors, tribal leaders, mayors, and city managers. These 
individuals may be present in the EOC, but more often provide guidance 
from elsewhere, either as part of a formal policy group or individually. They 
typically make decisions regarding priorities and one issues such as 
emergency declarations, large-scale evacuations, access to extraordinary 
emergency funding, waivers to ordinances and regulations, and adjudication 
of scarce resources. (FEMA, 2017, p. 47)  
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There are different EOC structures and staff organizations that will depend on how 
the EOC director or emergency manager establishes the C2 hierarchy. It is interesting to 
note that the state governors do not need to be present at the EOC. Nevertheless, “this does 
not mean that the governor should be engaged in the details of disaster response operations, 
but the governor’s presence in the EOC can serve to defuse interagency turf battles and 
eliminate bureaucratic red tape” (National Governors Association Center for Best Practices 
[NGA], 2007, p. 14). Within the NIMS, no guideline or regulation mandates government 
elected officials need to be a part of the EOC. The NIMS does guarantee that government 
officials are working together side-by-side. One needs to remember that the military and 
civilians have a different command chain, so communication is vital to make sure both 
sides de-conflict requirements and acquisitions. 
The purpose of the stakeholder analysis is to inform the planners of the competing 
interests for services and supplies in support of disaster response and recovery. A 
secondary benefit of this analysis is for CCOs. By understanding all available 
organizations, performing market research per FAR Part 10 (2020) can be tailored to the 
disaster environment. The COAD, VOAD, and FEMA regional offices are excellent 
resources for identifying local suppliers focused on disaster recovery. The last benefit of 
this analysis is understanding the USAF’s internal players, including the well-known CES 
and the lesser-known CAP. The next section utilizes the stakeholder section to inform the 
different policies and procedures that various agencies must consider when integrating. 
While some of these stakeholders will never see or work with each other, their collective 
work will rebuild the community and help it return to normal. With so many different 
government layers, it is imperative to understand what each organization’s roles and 
responsibilities are, despite how daunting that task may appear. 
E. DISASTER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
This section identifies the different policies and procedures related to the various 
government agencies that may be involved in the disaster environment. While multiple 
agencies use the same laws and regulations, each organization may interpret or implement 
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them differently. These different interpretations can even occur in the same agencies, 
which can be a blessing or a curse in the contracting career field. 
When a natural disaster occurs, the USAF will set up a C2 center per AFMAN 10–
2504 (AFCEC, 2013), published March 13, 2013. According to the manual, the definition 
of a C2 is 
the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of the mission. (AFCEC, 2013, p. 47) 
When the C2 forms, the squadrons, flights, or other essential personnel members 
may differ based on location and mission set. An example would be if a disaster hits in an 
OCONUS location, local nationals will be members of the C2 because there needs to be a 
steady communication line for the local populace with what the base is doing; this would 
be a member of the public affairs section. However, there are squadrons, flights, or other 
essential personnel that preside at all AF locations such as CES, CS, CONS, Comptroller 
Squadron (CPTS), FSS, LRS, SFS, aircraft maintenance squadron (AMXS), maintenance 
squadrons (MXS), operations group (OG), the base commander, and the base commander’s 
support staff, which can include legal, public affairs, safety, and others. These agencies 
assigned at the C2 have 
responsibilities to ensure overall success of unit and installation mission 
priorities and management of emergency response and recovery operations. 
Each level also performs organization and installation support functions to 
enable safe management of incidents that threaten the primary mission of 
the installation. Actions are prompted from standard operating instructions, 
checklists and other written procedures. (AFCEC, 2013, p. 27) 
Again, each location and agency will have a different mission and required 
operation based on the natural disaster that occurred. Some of the agencies mentioned 
above will be needed throughout the disaster, while some may never be used at all or just 
may not be necessary for a specific disaster or mission set. The purpose of identifying and 
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integrating these agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and regulations is to minimize the 
uncertainties that are inherent within a disaster environment.  
One of AFICC’s goals is to enlighten other USAF squadrons regarding the 
importance of contingency contracting and how acquisitions can support their mission sets. 
The USAF is using the phrase operational contract support (OCS) to explain the 
significance. OCS was created to show commanders, Airmen, and the local community 
what contracting is and how it is integrated within everything throughout a disaster 
response. The JP 4-10 (JCS, 2019b) goes into further details on what OCS means, as well 
as the three pillars or lines of effort (LOE) of OCS. These pillars explain the USAF mission. 
The pillars and what they do are as follows: 
Contract integration (the plan pillar) occurs before and during all planning 
phases to anticipate and synchronize contracting support into the operation. 
… Through the contracting support LOE (the procurement pillar), 
contracting professionals execute their authority and coordinate contracts in 
support of joint operations. … OCS LOE, contractor management (the 
manage pillar), involves control, support, and integration of contractor 
personnel and associated equipment deployed for use in the operational 
area. (Trevino et al., 2019, pp. 5, 7) 
These three pillars help facilitate communication within the community and with 
any other force to help with the rebuilding process. Tyndall AFB’s experience with 
Hurricane Michael in 2018 is a recent example with multiple lessons to improve future 
reaction time. One lesson learned resulted after contracting officers from Langley AFB, 
VA, deployed to Tyndall AFB, FL, and duplicated efforts on contracts that were already in 
place. There were confusing communication efforts between different agencies and entities 
regarding who was responsible for which contract or project. Information was readily 
available to utilize the existing contracts, but the personnel from Langley AFB intended to 
use their own contracts. One of the most egregious examples of these duplicative efforts 
was the creation of three separate contracts for tarping and building assessments by three 
different entities within DOD: the Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair 
Squadron (REDHORSE), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) 
contractor, and the base operations support contractor (Trevino et al., 2019). If the OCS 
pillars were followed, there would have been integration and de-conflicting of this 
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procurement, saving time—which is in short supply during a disaster—and the taxpayers’ 
money.  
When a natural disaster occurs, the first agency that comes into mind may be 
FEMA. FEMA is known for being one of the first federal organizations to go to where the 
natural disaster hits to assess the damages and provide the needed supplies. FEMA’s 
response time varies with how long it takes for the location to ask for FEMA’s help or for 
the federal government to order them to respond. Using the example of Hurricane Michael 
again, FEMA responded in 4 days. The state’s and city’s deployment will normally occur 
first to help with the situation as there are additional steps to request FEMA’s assistance 
(i.e. Stafford Act).  
Before going into FEMA’s microsections and how FEMA handles contracts and 
the contract actions, understanding FEMA’s macromission is essential.  
FEMA is responsible for monitoring states, territories, and tribal 
governments to ensure they are properly administering grants. States, 
territories, and tribal governments, in turn, must manage local government 
and non-government entities to ensure grant fund expenditures comply with 
Federal procurement requirements. (Mak, 2019, p. 5) 
FEMA has been in the spotlight due to their response and handling of these natural 
disasters. FEMA is a federal organization, so they follow the same guidelines as other 
federal agencies when it comes to contract actions.  
[FEMA] competes procurements whenever possible and practical, uses 
advance contracting for recurring disaster-related requirements, and at 
times uses other contracting methods. FEMA is responsible for ensuring all 
contract activities comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
which requires agencies to carry out acquisition planning activities for all 
acquisitions to ensure that the Government meets its needs in the most 
effective, economical, and timely manner possible. (Mak, 2019, p. 4) 
All federal agencies look at the FAR for guidelines for what procedural actions 
need to happen to award a legal contract. Per FAR 8.004 Use of other sources (2020), 
agencies are encouraged to use existing sources such as federal supply schedules, 
governmentwide acquisition contracts, multi-agency contracts, and other existing contracts 
within the federal purview. FEMA, has awarded their own advance contracts in lieu of 
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utilizing already existing contracts within GSA Advantage (FEMA, 2020a; GSA, 2020a). 
In 2017, FEMA used advance contracts for $4.5 billion worth of goods or services, 
including debris removal, prefabricated and portable buildings, inspection services, and 
power transmission equipment installation. While these services and products are needed, 
FEMA does not have the training to manage these contracts. Mak (2018) reported in GAO 
report GAO-18-335 that FEMA’s advance contracts have an “outdated strategy and unclear 
guidance on how contracting officers should use advance contracts during a disaster, and 
challenges [in] performing acquisition planning” (Mak, 2018a, p. 2). Training for FEMA 
contracting officers is limited; however, there is training for the contracting officer’s 
technical representative (COTR). As recently as 2018, the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs noted that FEMA does not effectively award 
prepositioned contracts. FEMA tends to expedite the acquisition process, leading to subpar 
market research and less competition, increasing cost, and negatively impacting delivery 
times of critical products. According to FEMA, these are some of their responsibilities: 
The program office acquiring the contracted goods and services selects a 
COTR from its staff. The selection is sent to the contracting officer, who 
verifies that the nominee has the prerequisite training for the contract. The 
COTR is then appointed to the contract by the contracting officer and is 
authorized to monitor the contract on behalf of the contracting officer. 
However, the COTR is not authorized to make any contractual 
commitments or changes that may affect the contract price, terms, or 
conditions without the approval of the contracting officer. Some COTRs are 
assisted by task monitors (also known as project or technical monitors), who 
review and report on the technical aspects of the contractor’s performance, 
such as compliance with specific contract terms. The COTR role can be 
either part time or full time, and is often a collateral duty. (Bumgardner et 
al., 2011, p. 4) 
While this information is similar to that of other federal organizations, comparing 
the contracting officers is not as simple. Understandably, FEMA needs their own 
contracting officers. The authors could find no information on whether contracting officers 
from other federal organizations communicate to each other before, during, or after the 
natural disaster occurs. The authors assume this occurs during joint exercises; however, no 
after action reports were found. Natural disasters that occur in the United States are not 
always near military installations. Even so, in order to minimize contracts for the federal 
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government, FEMA and other military contracting agencies can work together to simplify 
the process through the application of the Economy Act. To maximize the utility of the 
Economy Act (2020), stakeholders within the federal government should strategically 
source similar requirements such as roofing, portable bathrooms, and architect and 
engineering (A&E) services. In doing so, there can potentially be monetary savings 
realized, but more importantly, the result would be a structured and well-managed supply 
chain that all stakeholders could utilize without internal competition. One example of this 
approach is between the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and FEMA for fuel 
requirements under ESF 12 (DHS, 2020m). The majority of the disasters have similar 
requirements, and by identifying these requirements and the primary stakeholders 
responsible for managing each requirement, the community will recover faster and more 
efficiently.  
When it comes to FEMA contracting, even though FEMA is part of the federal 
government and follows the same regulations, FEMA is an organization that does their 
contracting work independently. When looking at the literature for FEMA contracting 
actions and processes, positives are scarce. Most of the literature review for FEMA is after 
action congressional joint hearings on how FEMA can improve future endeavors. One of 
FEMA’s offerings to improve these conditions is to implement a procurement disaster 
assistance team. This team is “to provide procurement-specific training and resources to 
state and local government officials, typically during response efforts, to achieve greater 
compliance with procurements under grants” (Mak, 2019, p. 5). It is difficult to say whether 
these policy changes have worked since—as of June 5, 2020—there are no data to back it 
up. It will also take some time to see if changes have been made, as it took multiple years 
to get data and information from Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in 2005. FEMA is still 
learning from their mistakes, and that was over a decade ago. Having these joint hearings 
are beneficial and shine a light where improvements are needed.  
Continuing with other federal government agencies, DHS has its own framework 
for managing natural disasters, and it is called the NRF. The NRF publication is on its 4th 
edition and was last updated on October 28, 2019. According to the executive summary, 
the NRF “provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation 
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responds to all types of incidents” (DHS, 2019b, p. 2). The NRF builds lifelines throughout 
each community, though the word lifeline only started being written in the 4th edition of 
the NRF publication. Lifelines with the community are needed to succeed, and DHS 
determined this rhetoric was required to explain the mission. There are two interpretations 
to the community lifeline, that they “are interdependent and vulnerable to cascading 
failures” and that they rely “on businesses and infrastructure owners and operators who 
have the expertise and primary responsibility for managing their systems in emergencies” 
(DHS, 2019b, p. 2). Since the last NRF publication, which was in 2016, the 2019 
publication “expands principles and concepts to integrate government and private sector 
response efforts better and introduces the community lifelines concept and terminology” 
(DHS, 2019b, p. 7). Contracting services are in two sections of the ESF annex: Public 
Works and Engineering (Annex 3) and Logistics (Annex 7). There are 15 annexes, and 
each involves some level of contracting support. Annex 3 and Annex 7 specifically deal 
with creating and awarding contracts, which is the sole responsibility of a warranted 
contracting officer. ESF Annex 3 addresses what the DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) can accomplish when disaster strikes in “emergency contracting support or life-
saving and life-sustaining services” (DHS, 2019b, p. 45). ESF Annex 7 highlights include 
procuring supplies for the survivors and responders and outlining what the GSA and 
DHS/FEMA will do to help. The resource support in ESF Annex 7 includes contracting 
services.  
For joint service policy and procedures, information is secretive in some aspects. 
For example, in contracting, each service has its own contracting writing system. Because 
of this, it makes it harder to work together. If a USAF member needs to deploy with the 
U.S. Army (USA) to help with contingency contracting, it will be harder to work and access 
the system. There used to be a joint service exercise called Operation Contract Support 
Joint Exercise (OCS-JX) with all these negatives. This exercise was active from 2014–
2017 and was designed for the USAF, the USA, Defense Contract Management (DCM), 
and Defense Logistics Agency Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office. The exercise 
consisted of 
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450 service members from numerous career fields outside the standard 
trifecta of contracting, legal, and financial management to showcase cross-
service and cross-specialty ownership of OCS. The downsizing of this event 
comes at a detriment to the joint warfighting community. Enlisted and 
officer members alike from Logistics, Security Forces, Maintenance and 
other career fields took part in this exercise and realized in short order the 
role they played in OCS endeavors. Paring this exercise down to a minimal-
force, contracting-centric effort is an enormous missed opportunity and only 
furthers the misperception that other specialties are absolved from any 
responsibility in executing OCS. (Meyer, 2018, pp. 10–11) 
These yearly exercises took place in Hawaii and Arizona; unfortunately, OCS-JX 
was unfunded after 3 years. As of June 2020, there are no plans to restart the exercise. Each 
service is now in the process of updating or creating a new exercise that fits what they think 
the future will hold. 
With policies and procedures changing every day, it is virtually impossible to keep 
up with all of them. Regardless of the abolition of OCS-JX, between JP 4-10’s guidance 
and GEN Holt’s (2019) Air Force Contracting Flight Plan’s the USAF contracting career 
field understands the value of bridging the gaps between the stovepiped agencies. The 
flight plan incorporates four lines of effort of which two are directly involved in this 
project: Line of Effort 1: Building Mission-Focused Business Leadership and Line of 
Effort 4: Expeditionary Contracting as a Joint Force Capability. This suggested TTX design 
will push contracting personnel to understand the many different federal missions involved 
within the HADR environment (mission focused and joint focused) while improving 
contingency fundamentals and preparation. One day, the policies and procedures might be 
the same for everyone, but until then, the best option is to align priorities, and understand 
and mitigate differences within those priorities. 
F. EXERCISE DESIGN APPROACHES 
This section reviews how different organizations design and create exercises. 
Developing exercises helps and trains people to prepare them for what might occur. Each 
organization has its own unique jargon to help further the education and knowledge for the 
future. By reviewing and incorporating different organizations’ methods, the TTX will 
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hopefully encourage embracing the whole disaster environment instead of only viewing 
the environment from one lens.  
Before beginning to create recommendations for the next CONUS HADR exercise, 
the authors’ first question was whether a TTX is the best method of training and testing the 
USAF career field for emergency preparedness and how it can be best utilized. Chen et al. 
(2002) researched tabletop drills’ efficacy versus real exercises regarding leadership, 
communication, and skills in an emergency setting for hospitals. They concluded that skills 
training must still occur independently of the TTX or field operation exercise and that the 
TTX is a more effective training setting for testing plans. Fowkes et al. (2010) published 
another study to measure the effectiveness of TTXs. Out of the 30 sites they tested, 21 
(91%) showed improvements in their emergency plans and actions after utilizing the 
exercise (Fowkes et al., 2010).  
The CJCSM 3500.03E provides the “policy for determining joint training 
requirements, planning and executing joint training, and assessing training for input to 
command readiness” (JCS, 2015, p. 3). This manual is DOD-centric. However, it does 
mention humanitarian assistance disaster response three times with particular attention to 
civilian mission counterparts. The CJCSM 3500.03E Appendix B provides a method to 
design training events that optimize the requirements’ benefits, as shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Methods, Modes, and Media Selection. Source: JCS (2015). 
FEMA provides a National Mitigation Framework (DHS, 2016c) and a National 
Protection Framework (DHS, 2016f) for pre-disaster notification. FEMA also provides 
three applicable pieces of training regarding designing an exercise: IS-120.c, IS-139.a, and 
how the military supplements FEMA’s efforts, IS-75. IS-120.c is the introduction course 
to exercises. This course is supposed to help multiple homeland security professionals 
know what to do during an emergency management situation and get the information for 
what an exercise should accomplish. IS-139.a is the course that is supposed to help in 
designing an exercise. There are many guidelines in the course that FEMA uses to get the 
students to understand how to translate real-world examples to allow for the future. IS-75 
is a course directed towards civilians to let them know what military resources are available 
during an emergency response. This course provides a perspective of the rules and 
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regulations military members have to follow and why from DHS’s point of view. These 
pieces of training help inform the methodology of the exercise to ensure a holistic 
environment that includes federal agencies, state governments, and local governments.  
AFICC requested a TTX. FEMA defines a TTX as 
a discussion-based exercise intended to stimulate discussion of various 
issues regarding a hypothetical situation. Tabletop exercises [TTX] can be 
used to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems 
needed to guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined 
incident. TTXs are typically aimed at facilitating understanding of concepts, 
identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. 
Participants are encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions 
through slow-paced problem-solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous 
decision-making that occurs under actual or simulated emergency 
conditions. TTXs can be breakout (i.e., groups split into functional areas) 
or plenary (i.e., one large group). (FEMA, n.d.) 
AFICC currently has a PACOM version of a TTX on their SharePoint, and the 
expectation is to have this CONUS HADR exercise mirror its format. Fortunately, the 
characteristics of FEMA’s definition of a TTX and the AFICC tabletop are identical. The 
authors use the developed environment, requirements, and scenarios to encourage dialogue 
and critical thinking by all three tiers of skill levels identified in YTTM while incorporating 
CFETP requirements determined by the contracting career field manager. 
Luckily, for designing an exercise, FEMA and AFICC appear to be on the same 
page. Having the same goal is a positive step to ensuring all federal government levels can 
work together. Once the exercise is built and the agencies can participate in the exercises 
together, more changes can improve other functions. The process will not be easy, but 
hopefully the manpower hours will pay off with fewer contracts and faster awards when 
completed. 
G. AFTER ACTION REPORTS 
In this section, firsthand knowledge and experiences will be considered to decide 
what worked and what did not in different contingency environments. This information 
could be the most critical because one can build an exercise, but the exercise will fail 
without past knowledge. Using these different experiences will give the proper context of 
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what other regions and disasters need, thereby improving the next contracting officer’s 
expertise. 
Savoia et al. (2012) concluded that lessons learned are invaluable in the 
development of training. Further, it is essential to have a sound knowledge management 
system. First, this project’s authors tried to identify a central repository of all USAF AARs 
and DOD AARs; however, one does not exist. Therefore, this section provides the reader 
a collection of AAR-centric documents the authors could collect to support the exercise 
recommendations.  
The databases searched include Dudley Knox Library’s Calhoun database, Google 
Scholar, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security, which partners with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The 
authors also contacted USNORTHCOM and AFICC for any USAF AARs that may not be 
public. The authors collected 104 AARs, GAO reports, and Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) reports from these databases, which the authors synthesized per their 
methodology. The request to the USAF provided the AARs listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. USNORTHCOM- and AFICC-Provided AARs 




After Action Report for Senior Contract Official (SCO) Operations 
in Support of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria (Widmann, 
2017) 
Hurricane Maria After Action Report (Johnson, 2017) 
Hurricane Irma After Action Report (Yoakum, 2017) 
Hurricane 
Michael 
After Action Report for Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) 




After Action Report for Operation Hurricane Relief Virgin Islands 
and Puerto Rico (VIPR; Nieves, 2017) 
Hurricane 
Harvey 
Hurricane Harvey CCO Support Provided by SSgt Derek Urban 
(Urban, 2017) 
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This method incorporates all of the different lessons learned and the strengths and 
weaknesses identified. This information, combined with the USAF contracting career 
field’s currently identified skills for the career field supplied by the CFETPs, provides a 
foundation for designing learning objectives that will inform which requirements AFICC 
should focus on in their next exercise.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Disaster frequency and spending have increased over the past 30 years (DHS, 
2020a). The USAF and other stakeholders must be prepared to react to these events, which 
requires proactive measures that include mitigation efforts, prevention efforts, and 
planning efforts. This MBA project targets the planning option through the development 
of a TTX framework and design and incorporates prior experiences of different 
stakeholders that have been and will be involved with HADR events in CONUS. The scope 
of these experiences are spread over the past 30 years of FEMA, state, and DOD reports. 
Methodology is discussed in the next chapter, and the authors describe how they created 




The methodology the authors chose in order to design a CONUS HADR exercise 
is based on the Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States (CJCSM 
3500.03), published on April 20, 2015 (JCS, 2015), as well as FEMA’s Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), published January 2020 (FEMA, 2020c). The 
authors first provide the reasons for creating a hurricane-based event instead of other 
options such as earthquakes, pandemics, or tornadoes. Next, the authors summarize 
CJCSM 3500.03 and its applications. The authors then cover additional guidance of DHS’s 
HSEEP. The authors also cover three different audiences that the exercise will train. Last, 
the authors will provide the format for the exercise. 
A. WHY CHOOSE A HURRICANE? 
Utilizing FEMA’s database of disasters since 1953, the authors chose to do a 
hurricane-based event. As discussed in Chapter II, Section B, 64% of disasters over the 
past 67 years have been severe storms, hurricanes, and floods (DHS, 2020a). Additionally, 
the FEMA, DOD, and NPS databases have a plethora of lessons learned, AARs, and GAO 
reports that cover disaster management and the potential for future DOD involvement in 
hurricane recovery efforts.  
The authors use Hurricane Michael, the worst hurricane to impact the USAF, as the 
case study regarding requirements based on an actual event (Allen, 2019). This event 
caused more than $3 billion of damage, and the Federal Procurement Data System–Next 
Generation (FPDS–NG) provided an excellent database of contracts awarded in response 
to the disaster.  
B. HOW THE DOD APPROACHES EXERCISE CREATION IN CJCSM 
3500.03 
The purpose of this section is to describe the CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) 
instructions for designing and running an exercise. This section, along with Section III.C 
of the HSEEP (FEMA, 2020c), provides the framework for the authors’ suggested exercise 
design, further explained in Section D: The DOD–FEMA Hybrid Exercise Framework. 
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The purpose of marrying the two designs is to base the TTX’s framework on the chain of 
command in disaster response. FEMA is the lead organization with USNORTHCOM, 
potentially setting up a joint task force (JTF) made up of multiple branches, including the 
USAF, as one of the subordinate agencies. By incorporating the different agencies’ 
approaches into one, the variation in training design can be updated based on other 
agencies’ updates to ensure that the USAF personnel is ready to step into the joint 
environment at USNORTHCOM and potentially work with FEMA directly.  
The CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) provides a training system that incorporates the 
identification of requirements, the plan to meet those requirements, and—upon execution of 
that plan—an assessment to validate the organization’s capability to accomplish the plan’s 
response to the requirements. This process, as shown in Figure 8, is a never-ending cycle.  
 
Figure 8. Joint Training System Four-Phase Process. 
Source: JCS (2015). 
CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) provides desired inputs, processes, and outputs for 
the requirements phase. This process is very similar to the purpose of the discussion points 
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in the HSEEP planning meetings. For this exercise, the Theater Campaign Plan is 
synonymous with a Disaster Response Plan.  To identify the requirements phase inputs, the 
authors utilized the following doctrines, documents, reports, and systems.  
• JCS Universal Task Development Tool (UTDT) system (utdt.js.mil)  
• JP 4-10 (JCS, 2019b) 
• JP 5-0 (JCS, 2017) 
• FEMA’s ESFs (DHS, 2020b–2020p) 
• AARs (see Chapter IV, Section C), including congressional reports and 
GAO reports 
• YTTM (Yoder, 2004) 
• Enlisted (6C) CFETP (Conger, 2016) 
• Officer (64P) CFETP (Applegate, 2017) 
• Civilian (1102) CFETP (Bennett, 2019) 
• Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (DOD, 2017) 
The authors reviewed, analyzed, and consolidated the potential FEMA and DOD 
missions, the lessons learned from the AARs, and the CFETP objectives to create a list of 
objectives and missions that a USAF CONS might support. These mission objectives and 
the subordinate requirements feed into the next CJCSM phase: plans. 
CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) also provides desired inputs, processes, and outputs 
for the plans phase. To identify the information, the authors used the requirements phase 
outputs and the requirements phase inputs to inform the training plan. CJCSM 3500.03 
(JCS, 2015) provides an in-depth review of a seven-step system to create a training plan.  
1. Update commander’s training guidance 
2. Analyze joint and agency mission essential tasks 
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3. Review training audience assessments and refine training audience based 
on training proficiency assessment review 
4. Develop training objectives (TOs) and determine training methods 
5. Design and schedule training events 
6. Determine high-interest training requirements 
7. Publish joint training plan (JTP) in Joint Training Information 
Management System (JTIMS) 
Figure 9 provides a flowchart that outlines a JTP for training and exercise 
development. 
 
Figure 9. Training Plan Process. Source: JCS (2015). 
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This MBA projects seek to influence the development and maintenance of an 
annual CONUS HADR TTX and provide an initial list of appropriate TOs and 
requirements to meet those TOs.  
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND 
EVALUATION PROGRAM 
DHS’s version of the CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) is the 2020 HSEEP (FEMA, 
2020c). The purpose of incorporating DHS’s doctrine into the DOD’s is that FEMA, an 
agency within DHS, runs lead in a federally declared disaster. This section provides insight 
into how DHS’s doctrine can be incorporated into the DOD’s. 
Similar to the CJCSM 3500.03 (JCS, 2015) requirements phase, the first step to the 
DHS exercise design is to identify, develop, and align the participants’ desired capabilities 
in response to a specific overall objective. After defining those objectives, the activities, 
planning team, design, and exercise development can occur. DHS provides templates for 
five meeting agendas for accomplishing the milestones needed to complete the exercise’s 
objectives. The HSEEP’s five meetings can supplement the CJCSM 3500.03’s seven-step 
model. The meetings provide specific discussions and outcomes that should be taking place 
during the CJCSM’s model that mimic the requirements and planning phase inputs, 
processes, and outputs format. In tandem, these two frameworks provide an invaluable 
roadmap into designing an exercise.  
The first topic is the exercise’s scope. The authors were directed to create a CONUS 
HADR TTX, which bounds the rules and laws that apply, as identified in Chapter II, 
Section C; however, this is not sufficient as HADR events can include anything from 
flooding, earthquakes, and biological phenomena. The authors utilized the FEMA disaster 
history database and determined a water-based event (flooding, hurricane, tropical storm) 
is the most likely event for members to face (see Chapter III, Section A). To meet the intent 
that the TTX be utilized by every CONS in the USAF without requiring additional players, 
the authors limit the event to the base. This limitation does not eliminate the need to 
simulate networking with other organizations and can be expanded or tailored for sites with 
the connections and skills already developed.  
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The second topic involves identifying objectives and capabilities. The authors 
utilized the CFETPs, FEMA’s ESFs, and the AARs to determine the objectives that will 
drive the requirements process, as directed by the CJCSM 3500.03. The HSEEP provides 
four focuses for consideration: threats and hazards, areas for improvement and capabilities, 
external sources and requirements, and accreditation standards and regulations (FEMA, 
2020c). The HSEEP provides a flowchart, which is provided in Figure 10. This flowchart 
mirrors JCSM’s planning inputs.  
 
Figure 10. Priorities, Objectives, and Capabilities. Source: FEMA (2020b). 
The third topic involves location and duration. There has been a push for telework 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, which provides an opportunity to split the squadron’s 
teams and simulate delayed and faulty communications during the HADR event. With 
teleworking’s flexibility in place of in-person meetings in conference rooms and offices, 
the authors have tailored the objectives and requirements to maximize the desired 
participation and limit the most experienced members from taking over. To maximize the 
flexibility of the TTX, the authors have developed three modules (pre-planning, disaster 
notification up to disaster occurrence, and post-disaster). The pre-planning portion focuses 
solely on all actions during pre-disaster notification (i.e., mitigation, preparation, and 
prevention). The post-disaster provides a simulated pre-disaster plan if the squadron 
decides to skip the exercise’s pre-disaster portion. If the squadron has the training time 
available, they can do both sections together or piecemeal the objectives and requirements 
over an indefinite amount of time. The authors provide a suggested detailed time line for 
the whole exercise, which is broken down by phase, objective, and requirement—allowing 
for maximum flexibility for the training manager. 
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The fourth topic involves the potential participants and their requisite participation. 
The authors identified a multitude of outside parties that bring unique knowledge, skills, 
and abilities to enhance the exercise. The authors used the AARs to provide insight into 
what requirements may come down from the outside players. Additionally, the authors 
offer and identify the need for recording each iteration of this exercise in an AAR-type 
format. The training manager or member of equal knowledge, skills, and abilities must 
meet this role’s requirements.  
The fifth topic is defining the exercise planning team makeup. The team consists of 
Dr. Deborah Gibbons, Cory Yoder, Captain Chase Lehocky, and Captain Geoffrey Bender. 
Additional members are necessary for the process, and those additional members are the 
training managers at each squadron. Although the training managers are not planning the 
initial framework, they will need to have the requisite tools to plan for this TTX at each of 
their respective squadrons.  
The sixth topic involves defining assumptions. Refer to Section I, Section D for the 
authors’ assumptions. The first assumption is that participants understand what CCO 
functions are and that the participants are familiar with the USAF and DOD contracting 
processes, rules, and regulations, including the information located in the FAR and the 
DFARS. The second assumption is that the training members have completed at least one 
training exercise mandated by the MICT. The final assumption is that the readers 
understand that contracting rules and regulations are changing every year, requiring the 
reader to know that the exercise developed is a framework adapted to fit their mission. 
The seventh topic involves defining how to control and evaluate the TTX. 
Fortunately, each squadron’s commander has an inspection program with trained 
individuals in inspections and feedback. The authors provide a training rubric based on the 
CFETPs and universal joint task list (UJTL) with inputs and outputs for the inspectors to 
utilize as an exercise evaluation guide. 
The eighth topic involves available resources. The authors broke available 
resources down into people, places, and supplies. AFICC has a SharePoint site for the 
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TTX’s material storage, and the site’s availability will depend on each squadron’s 
environment. 
The ninth topic involves engaging with senior leaders for guidance and intent. GEN 
Cameron Holt, deputy secretary of the Air Force for contracting, provided four lines of 
effort in regards to his vision for the USAF contracting career field which included building 
mission-focused business leaders, focusing on tools and not rules, improving processes, 
and improving the joint force capabilities in expeditionary contracting (AFICC, 2020). The 
fourth level of effort directs the contracting career field to develop contingency capabilities, 
with each level having a leader and team. He has also created a team to address the 
planning, coordinating, and marketing of the exercises.  
Last, the HSEEP guidance provides a list of documentation that the authors include 
in Appendix E, Section D: TTX Suggested Document List, which is based on the DHS’s 
guidance (FEMA, 2020b). This list of documents helps users of the TTX understand how 
to implement the training and provide feedback after the training occurs.  
By answering all of the DHS topics and addressing all of the documentation 
suggestions in Appendix E, Section D: TTX Suggested Document List, the suggested 
exercise design should meet the DHS’s framework. By synthesizing the DOD’s framework 
into the DHS framework, the authors have ensured that the created TTX is aligned with the 
DOD’s requirements, which should be aligned with FEMA’s, as they are the lead in 
CONUS HADR events. This framework, along with the CJCSM discussed in the previous 
section, informs the DOD–FEMA Hybrid Framework to meet both organizations’ intent.  
D. THE DOD–FEMA HYBRID EXERCISE FRAMEWORK 
The authors have translated the CJCSM’s seven steps and the HSEEP into a hybrid 
version to represent the organizational hierarchy in a federally declared disaster 
environment. The authors have also removed non-applicable topics, such as foreign 
organizations or warfare (in the case of the CJCSM 3500.03), and have removed 
operations-based requirements in HSEEP, as the TTX design is a discussion-based 
exercise.  
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Step 1 is to create a formalized commander’s training guidance from AFICC’s 
direction. This guidance includes developing a TTX for a CONUS HADR event that a 
training manager can run without additional training. 
Step 2 requires analyzing potential objectives associated with a CONUS HADR 
event. The inputs include the USAF contracting CFETPs and the YTTM model, relevant 
AARs (including CRS reports and GAO reports), FEMA’s ESFs, DOD’s joint task lists 
(JTLs), the discussion points from the HSEEP, and the initial training guidance. The 
authors perform qualitative analysis on the inputs to identify lesson objectives from the 
CFETPs, ESFs, and JTLs and lessons learned to accomplish this task. This includes 
identifying potential issues from the AARs to inform the possible objectives of this 
training. Once the analysis is performed, the desired outputs include a list of potential TOs 
for the Mission Essential Task List (HSEEP’s Master Scenario Events List). The list 
consists of a Required Documents List (see Appendix E, Section D) that names each 
required document and provides a template, an initial exercise concept, an initial time line 
to cover the exercise duration, and a list of potential stakeholders with their roles and 
responsibilities.  
Step 3 is to further develop and define the TOs for the TTX. The inputs include the 
outputs from the previous step along with another review of the AARs for objectives that 
might not be explicitly identified in the CFETP, ESF, or JTL. The authors qualitatively 
analyzed the AARs with the list of applicable CFETPs, ESFs, and JTLs to prioritize the 
initial list of objectives and categorize them into the exercise’s active phase (pre-disaster, 
during a disaster, or post-disaster). In addition to prioritizing and categorizing the list, each 
objective was reviewed to ensure that they were specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, 
and time-bound (FEMA, 2020b). The Required Documents List and templates were refined 
to ensure the participants have the tools and information needed to run the exercise, 
including the scope and scale of the TTX, the time line and duration of the exercise, and 
the Stakeholder Analysis Document. The desired outputs include the first draft of the 
Exercise Schedule, the final Stakeholder Analysis Document, and the final scope and scale 
of the TTX, included in the Commanders Guidance Document. 
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Step 4 is to suggest a design of the TTX based on the TOs and suggested exercise 
schedule. The inputs include the outputs from the previous three steps. From these inputs, 
the authors ensure each objective can be achieved by training each requirement within the 
TTX scope. The process involves reviewing each objective in the Mission Essential Task 
List (METL) and the Mission Scenario Event List (MSEL), the objective’s potential 
requirement(s), and the requirement’s place in the schedule. Once accomplished, the 
METL is reviewed again to ensure that all the tools and resources needed to achieve each 
requirement are provided, identified, and easily accessible. The outputs from this step are 
the final METL and MSEL, the final TTX schedule, and the Required Documents List with 
finalized templates for all of the requirements.  
Step 5 is to create two levels of formalized assessments based on the phases of a 
disaster and ensure that each objective’s requirement(s) can validate the assigned learning 
objective. There are two outputs from this step. The first output involves identifying each 
requirement’s question(s), locating an answer to each question that validates the lesson 
objective of the requirement, and providing a feedback mechanism to allow for corrections 
and updates to those answers and lessons. This mechanism includes a form to be filled out 
by the evaluator and their notetaker. Throughout the exercise, the notetaker identifies 
lessons that were learned and those that were not. The second output is the development of 
an AAR, which is accomplished at the end of the exercise. All participants develop the 
AAR, which will be consolidated by the training manager. The purpose of this AAR is to 
provide the AFICC training team appropriate feedback to update the training—including 
missing information, outdated lessons, and so on—and to institute a continuous 
improvement mentality for this training.  
Step 6 is to publish the TTX package to the AFICC SharePoint. This step also 
involves publicizing the location to the contracting career field, ensuring that participants 
understand how to use the material, and communicating where the TTX fits into the overall 
training strategy. 
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E. LESSON OBJECTIVES DESIGNED FOR SKILL SETS 
In this section, the authors identify how to categorize the intended training 
audience. The 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-level career field identifiers in the USAF are not a perfect 
fit for this exercise, as the roles and responsibilities are tied to position and rank, not only 
the level. YTTM describes three levels of knowledge and skills, as shown in Figure 11. 
The enlisted contracting CFETP identifies four levels of knowledge, skills, and abilities 
which fit into the YTTM (i.e., 3, 5, 7, and 9). The 3- and 5-levels fall under Tier 1, the 7-
level falls under Tier 2 and potentially Tier 3, and the 9-level falls under Tier 3. The 
YTTM’s tiers are a better fit to align the TOs than the CFETP four levels; however, the 
CFETP’s four levels must be incorporated to ensure a common framework. YTTM’s better 
fit is due to the flexibility of the YTTM’s tier system. A 20-year technical sergeant cannot 
attain the designation of 9-level regardless of the knowledge, skills, and abilities gained 
through 20 years of experience due to the rank requirement. However, the YTTM’s tiers 
take the individual’s knowledge, skills, expertise, and function to assign the sergeant into 
either Tier 2 or 3, depending on the situation.  
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Table 5. YTTM for Contingency Contracting Operations. 




For this exercise, the authors use the language of the CFETP’s four levels within 
the framework of the YTTM. To accomplish this, each requirement and objective was 
assigned a level within the YTTM framework. Once achieved, the authors converted the 
tier into its corresponding CFETP level(s) and the appropriate knowledge, skill, and ability 
level within each of the lesson objectives in the three USAF contracting CFETPs. 
Appendix A has a consolidated list of the CONUS HADR event applicable objectives from 
the civilian, enlisted, and officer CFETPs, as well as the minimum knowledge and ability 
based on the expectations of the YTTM framework. 
F. TTX EFFECTIVENESS 
Dausey et al. (2007) developed, conducted, and evaluated 31 TTXs, and their 
research has been cited 74 times since its creation. The lessons learned from their analysis 
can easily be applied to this TTX. First, they suggested that the exercise should have one 
specific objective. This proposed exercise framework is designed to focus on the 
contracting career field’s potential role in disaster management before, during, and after a 
disaster. Secondly, they suggested that the TTX should be designed around critical areas 
instead of the overall scenario. To meet these suggestions, the authors review the AARs 
and GAO reports to focus on the lessons learned from each of these reports to identify 
trouble areas. Some examples include identifying all stakeholders involved during the 
disaster, understanding the impact of awarding locally in a low-resource environment, and 
locating and utilizing advance contracts during a disaster. The third lesson that the authors 
provided is that despite the exercise encouraging discussions and open debate, it is crucial 
to provide “forced, targeted, and time delineated” (Dausey et al., 2007, p. 7) decisions so 
that the audience understands the intended outcome. Applying this tactic to each of the 
requirements identified within this TTX framework will have a learning outcome that will 
be provided upon completing the task or overall scenario. Fourth, the authors suggested 
that exercises should be strategic in who is included in the exercise. Every member added 
increases the risk that the exercise will derail. This TTX provides critical participants 
outside of the CONS to contact and provide potential handouts if the additional personnel 
is too cumbersome to the TTX. Dausey et al. (2007) also suggested splitting the broad 
audience into different subgroups, which this TTX does. At a minimum, this TTX has a 
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planning team (the MBA project team), the action team (each squadron), the support team 
(AFICC), and the teacher/evaluator team (training managers at each site). The last 
suggestion was that expanding the exercise design stakeholders can illuminate the 
unknown unknowns in a disaster environment (Kurian, 2013). The authors have included 
optional requirements that involve reaching out to other local organizations to tailor the 
TTX to the local area. For example, one condition consists of reaching out to the local 
FEMA representative involved with acquisitions to identify advance contracts and 
potential supply chain management issues and request input into the design of the TTX to 
include local tailoring.  
G. CONCLUSION 
By combining the two frameworks, the authors intend to reduce miscommunication 
and misunderstanding between the DOD and FEMA when dealing with a CONUS HADR 
event. This event is a unique instance due to the DOD’s and FEMA’s dynamic in a federally 
declared CONUS disaster. A common theme in the AARs and GAO reports is 
miscommunication in this environment. If the design methodology does not incorporate 
both agencies’ doctrines from the start, the unknown unknowns become worse in training, 
communication, and evaluation. The FEMA–DOD Hybrid Framework aligns the 
contracting TTX  into the organizational hierarchy (FEMA > USNORTHCOM > USAF) 
in order to appropriately perform analysis and development as if in a CONUS HADR 
environment. Additionally, by incorporating all three CFETPs within the YTTM, trainers 
and trainees will be better able to translate the required ability levels the authors have 
identified. Finally, by incorporating the research of Dausey et al. (2007), the authors can 




This chapter utilizes the methodology described in Chapter III to inform the 
contracting career field’s contingency contracting team on putting together a CONUS 
HADR TTX. First, the authors created a synthesized Joint Mission Task List (JMTL) to 
provide the first part of the TTX objectives section. Second, the authors synthesized 
relevant HADR skill sets included in the three contracting CFETPs (Civilian [1102], 
Enlisted [6C], and Officer [64P]) and fit those skill sets into the three-tiered system in 
YTTM. Third, the authors synthesized 104 AARs for potential requirements within 
FEMA’s 15 ESFs, finances, manpower, and training within the authors’ three-phase 
approach of pre-disaster, disaster, and post-disaster. The conclusions of this analysis 
inform Appendices A–G.  
A. JOINT MISSION TASK LIST SYNTHESIS 
Utilizing the DOD’s UJTL UTDT system, the authors pulled all potential Air Force 
tasks that included JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, in its description, resource, or 
task title, which provided 32 potential tasks. These 32 tasks are explicitly tied to how 
contracting is planned into the DOD’s operations. Appendix B provides the synthesized 
version of these 32 separate tasks into nine overarching concepts. The table includes a 
subject (task title), a brief description, measurements associated with the tasks to validate 
ability, the referenced task list numbers in the system, and the system’s references for 
guidance and instruction. The JMTL measures are designed in answerable questions to 
provide deliverables to validate the local contracting office’s ability to meet the USAF’s 
potential mission sets for the contracting career field. 
The authors identified two measurable outcomes for each of the tasks identified, 
which can be found within the UTDT system. The first measure is a yes-or-no response. If 
the trainer answers in the affirmative, then the task is complete; if not, then the trainer is 
advised to work with the participants until the task is complete. The binary response may 
be used to determine whether or not the unit has an updated form or list (for example, 
Appendix B, Task 1.2.) or whether the participants have an understanding up to the level 
64 
specified in the following section, Section B. If the answer is negative, there are resources 
to build the requisite skill sets in both Appendix A and Appendix B.  
The second measure is less direct and requires the application of the experience of 
the training manager. Some tasks require a list as a deliverable; however, the synthesized 
JMTL does not specify what this list’s format should be or which individuals must approve 
or agree to it, nor does it direct what is considered sufficient. The trainer can measure this 
requirement’s output through the synthesized CFETP’s expected levels of understanding 
based on an individual’s role within the YTTM (see Appendix A). This provides flexibility 
to meet each CONS’s local demands, as they differ slightly in regards to their required real-
life missions and their allocated manpower. For example, suppose the USAF base is remote 
and the mission is small. In that case, local operation plans (OPLANs) may not need to be 
as complicated as the plans for bases that house multiple agencies and headquarters.  
The utilization of the synthesized task list still meets the comprehensive plan’s 
goals; however, Appendix B is explicitly geared towards a CONUS HADR event from a 
USAF perspective. In this section—along with Chapter IV, Sections A-C—the authors 
provide the Air Force with a good objective list to choose from when devising a TTX. 
Using the JP 4-10–tied tasks, the USAF should be ready if the JTF directs assistance on 
behalf of the DOD (JCS, 2019b). Per FEMA’s ESF Annexes, FEMA will request assistance 
after their capacity is met, meaning the DOD and/or USNORTHCOM. The USAF must be 
ready by proxy before they are asked, as the disaster will have already commenced (FEMA, 
2020c).  
B. USAF CONTRACTING CFETP SYNTHESIS FOR A CONUS HADR 
EVENT 
There are currently three CFETPs in the contracting career field: Enlisted (Conger, 
2016), Officers (Applegate, 2017), and Civilians (Bennett, 2019). As was discussed in 
Chapter III, the authors synthesized these three CFETPs within the YTTM, located in 
Appendix A. This section describes how to use the appendix, using the first knowledge 
requirement as an example.  
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Each requirement has a reference to each CFETP and a level of knowledge 
identified within the YTTM. This allows the training manager to update each contracting 
individual’s training plan to validate that they have the suggested knowledge set required 
to meet a CONUS HADR event’s potential missions. 
It is important to note that each CFETP is uniquely labeled and organized; however, 
the CFETPs have identical designations for requirements (see Table 6). Although the 
CFETPs identify core tasks, the authors created a synthesized Task List for a CONUS 
HADR TTX event. In future research, it may be beneficial to identify core tasks within a 
HADR TTX event and reviewing the selected tasks the authors identified. Because the 
TTX is discussion-based and not performance-based, the scope of the synthesized HADR 
knowledge set is limited to the task and subject knowledge level scales identified in each 
CFETP provided in Table 6—in other words, the letters, not the numbers. Both the enlisted 
(6C) and officer (64P) CFETPs have number identifiers for each task and subject 
knowledge requirement, while the civilian (1102) CFETP does not. Fortunately, the task 
list is available in Excel; therefore, the authors used each subject knowledge and task row 
number within the most current software version (2019). The enlisted CFETP contained an 
easy-to-use header system based on the FAR, which the authors emulated. The authors then 
added additional requirements found within the other two CFETPs and additional topics 
that were not included within any of the CFETPs that fit under each of the enlisted headers. 
An example of a unique 1102 and 64P knowledge requirement is “identify fraud 
indicators,” which is Task 10.3 for the officer CFETP and Row 81 for the civilian CFETP. 
The authors placed this requirement under Header 3: Improper Business Practices and 
Personal Conflict of Interest to add this requirement. For the enlisted reference, we kept it 
as the header, as it falls within the purview of the header but not any specific function. An 
example of a topic introduced within the synthesized list that was not explicitly listed 
within any of the CFETPs is the Stafford Act (2019), which the authors placed under the 




Table 6. Task and Subject Knowledge Level Definitions. Adapted from 




a Can name parts, tools, and simple facts about the task 
(NOMENCLATURE) 
b Can determine step-by-step procedures for doing the task 
(PROCEDURES) 
c Can identify why and when the task must be done and why 
each step is needed (OPERATING PRINCIPLES) 





A Can identify basic facts and terms about the subject 
(FACTS) 
B Can identify the relationship of basic facts and state general 
principles about the subject (PRINCIPLES) 
C Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions 
about the subject (ANALYSIS) 
D Can evaluate conditions and make proper decisions about 
the subject (EVALUATION) 
 
The remainder of this section describes how to use Appendix A. The first column 
contains each requirement listed within a topic header. The first knowledge requirement is 
titled Fiscal Law, which falls within Header 1: Federal Acquisition Regulations System. 
Additionally, the authors place references for the topics. This requirement falls under the 
guidance of FAR Part 1 (2020), AFI 65–601 (Roth, 2018), and DOD Financial 
Management Regulation (FMR) 7000.14-R (Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 
2019). The next three columns provide the reference within each CFETP to which the 
requirements are tied. Fiscal Law ties into Task 1.1 in the 6C CFETP (Conger, 2016), Task 
47 in the 64P CFETP (Applegate, 2017), and the Excel Row 385 in the 1102 CFETP 
(Bennett, 2019). The last three columns provide the suggested task knowledge level or 
subject knowledge level per the YTTM.  
This synthesized task and subject knowledge list are critical to the success of the 
HADR TTX. Without an expectation of task or subject knowledge, neither the lead trainer 
nor the planner for the CONS will assess the ability of the squadron’s personnel to meet a 
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mission set. For example, if none of the planners (YTTM’s third tier) demonstrate the 
ability to analyze how a supply chain works and its impact within a disaster environment, 
FEMA, USNORTHCOM, the local state government, and other stakeholders may compete 
against each other. This impact can cause increased prices, delayed deliveries, and other 
adverse outcomes as suppliers await the highest bid or confuse all of the government’s 
different demands. As disasters increase in frequency, it will be easier to predict the 
requirements based on the records within the federal contract database FPDS–NG while 
addressing trends within the AARs from CRS and GAO, which should help decrease the 
chaos inherent in a disaster. 
C. AAR REVIEW 
AARs and spend analyses are an excellent resource for organizations to decrease 
the unknowns of a disaster’s effect. As mentioned earlier, the frequency of disasters has 
increased over the past several decades, leading to more information regarding positive and 
negative outcomes. It is important to note that despite the government’s great analytics, the 
government and the public will always be at the mercy of natural disasters over which we 
have no control. As an example, in August 2020, it was predicted that two hurricanes were 
going to hit the Gulf Coast: Hurricane Marco and Hurricane Laura (The Weather Channel, 
2020a). When they got closer to the mainland, Hurricane Marco disappeared, while 
Hurricane Laura accelerated to a Category 4 the night before landfall (The Weather 
Channel, 2020b). Even though a storm can change at the last minute, the processes that 
disaster responders follow and the plans that they create do not need to change. There is 
plenty of information from the 104 AARs that the authors analyzed to improve responders’ 
preparation for a disaster. There are 15 different ESFs provided by FEMA and three created 
by the authors (manpower, finance, and training) that will be discussed and categorized 
within the authors’ three-phased approach of pre-disaster, disaster, and post-disaster. It is 
important to note that not all ESFs will apply for each category, and the DOD may be in a 
primary or support function. Appendix C includes a sample fill-in table to help bridge the 
local bases’ AFMAN 10–2502 guidance to the overarching FEMA guidance. USACE, part 
of the DOD, is the primary on ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering, while the DOD is 
recognized as a support agency for all of the other ESFs. Within those ESF Annexes, 
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FEMA outlines roles and responsibilities for the primary and support agencies. 
Unfortunately, unlike in their 2008 version, each ESF appendix is separated into its own 
document, so the authors created a method to consolidate the appendices into a DOD-
centric consolidated list in Appendix C, which breaks down each FEMA ESF responsibility 
and assigns them to either the primary agency or the DOD. With the current push for more 
joint focus within the USAF and the DOD, the USAF needs to keep the potential for future 
missions in mind (Holt, 2019). 
The ESF priorities and responsibilities on a level above that of the local base should 
focus on contracting personnel, not just the local base’s needs. It is important to remember 
that while the USAF base may be trying to recover, so are other bases within the proximity 
of the disaster, as well as the surrounding local government and population. Without 
considering other government agencies, the contracting career field can accidentally create 
an internal competition, which helps the external competitors (i.e., suppliers) drive up 
prices by encouraging government agencies to bid against each other. This competition can 
potentially hurt the region’s overall mission and the USAF base, as there are finite 
resources and money.  
 AAR Review: Pre-Disaster 
This section is broken out by each ESF and the additional finance, manpower, and 
training. This section provides the qualitative analysis identified within the context of 
actions taken pre-disaster to mitigate, prepare, or prevent impacts from the disaster. The 
authors excluded ESF 4: Firefighting and ESF 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials in this 
section because trends were not identified within the 104 AARs researched.  
a. Finance 
When analyzing the AARs, there were recurring finance issues that could be 
addressed pre-disaster. The first issue that occurred three times was that when individuals 
deployed to a location, they did not know the lines of accounting or the correct codes to 
obligate the funds (Johnson, 2017; Mak, 2019; Widmann, 2017). The second issue that 
occurred two times was a misunderstanding of how much money was available, which led 
to running out of funds and mismanaged funds (Johnson, 2017; Jones, 2010). The third 
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issue, which occurred two times, involved funds expenditure and the change in priorities 
from now (recovery) to the future (mitigation and prevention; Currie, 2019c, 2019d). Last, 
financial procedures were complicated due to multiple systems from different agencies 
deployed and inadequate procedures, which was reported five times (Cuffari, 2020; Davis, 
2019b; Galindo & Kennedy, 2019; Jenkins, 2012; Nieves, 2017). Understandably, one will 
not know the financial amount needed before a disaster; however, understanding these 
trends and how to mitigate them will improve the contracting officers’ ability to operate 
and ensure the success of the operation.  
b. Manpower 
Manpower issues ranged from not understanding the roles of the personnel 
deployed to being understaffed. When deploying personnel to a location, it is vital to make 
sure the deployed personnel are competent and knowledgeable about the mission, which 
was identified as an issue six times (Currie, 2018b; FEMA, 2012, 2013b, 2015; Flagler 
County Board of County Commissioners [FCBCC], 2017; Urban, 2017; Widmann, 2017). 
If inexperienced personnel deploy, issues can arise that will affect the civilian populace 
and hinder results. Furthermore, this issue that occurred once might seem small, but having 
the employees wear a uniform will help distinguish their roles in the operations (Jones, 
2010). Overall, the biggest issue identified in the AARs was not having the correct number 
of personnel for the mission (Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2018b; Mak, 2019); this issue 
occurred three different times. Last, Hurricane Joaquin presented an interesting problem of 
tracking personnel internally to the task force (The National Emergency Management 
Agency [NEMA], 2015). With that stated, it would be interesting to know whether those 
in charge have an accurate picture of the internal federal personnel (i.e., FEMA, military, 
etc.) and the contractor manpower (i.e., outsourced manpower). Unfortunately, with 
downsizing the government, fixing that problem might become more pronounced moving 
forward. 
c. Training 
Training is always an issue, and every organization that published an AAR talked 
about not having the right amount of training. Different organizations wished that they had 
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more training in payment methods, contract writing, utilizing checklists, understanding 
what the state and local partners do, developing policies and procedures, and understanding 
the different terminology each organization uses (Besser, 2006; Creighton et al., 2014; 
FCBCC, 2017; Galindo & Kennedy, 2019; Information Collection, Analysis, and 
Dissemination Team [ICAD Team], 2010; Mak, 2019; National Emergency Management 
Association [NEMA], 2018). Some topics that are essential to improving training are 
missed, including how to evacuate and care for disabled or elderly citizens and how to de-
conflict and manage competing missions and tasks (Denigan-Macauley, 2020). 
d. ESF 1: Transportation 
Transportation and location awareness (i.e., map knowledge) are critical in 
understanding the routes to take before a disaster strikes and understanding the planned 
coordinates of emergency centers. This issue occurred on four different occasions, where 
responders did not know where transportation buses were located, did not have updated 
and accurate Global Positioning System (GPS) information, and did not have the correct 
number of vehicles to transport essential personnel and civilians to safe locations 
(Christopher et al., 2005; Creighton et al., 2014; Governor’s Office of Homeland Security 
and Emergency Preparedness [GOHSEP], 2012; Jones, 2010). Even though this is pre-
disaster, roadways and airports can still be damaged due to flooding before the disaster, 
and this issue was brought up on three separate occasions (C. Currie, 2015; Creighton et 
al., 2014; ICAD Team, 2010). A USAF base’s second-best asset, next to its personnel, is 
its airfield, which should be a top priority of USAF wing leadership (Scott & Watson, 
2018). The airfield can serve as an excellent hub for personnel to come in and out. Without 
transportation, lives will be lost due to the needed supplies being stagnated. 
e. ESF 2: Communications 
Knowing how many organizations are present for the recovery mission to succeed, 
one can argue that the mission will be lost without communication. Unfortunately, some 
of the issues that occur pre-disaster happen when there is no disaster in sight. For example, 
there are issues with bandwidth, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) capabilities, cell phone 
capabilities, SharePoint and Air Force Contracting Information Technology (CON-IT) 
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access, email connectivity, and having different organizations either using personal 
computers or government-issued computers (Alabama Emergency Management Agency, 
2014; City of Marco Island, 2018; Conover, 2008; FCBCC, 2017; FEMA, 2013a, 2015; 
Galindo & Kennedy, 2019; Johnson, 2017; King & McKay, 2006; NEMA, 2018; 
Widmann, 2017). These communication issues occurred 21 times. The last one—regarding 
personal versus government-issued computers—might not seem like a big deal, but with 
the various computers having unique firmware and connectivity options, they might not be 
able to communicate with each other. Last, communication with different organizations 
was spotty during nine separate occasions (Alabama Emergency Management Agency, 
2014; City of Marco Island, 2018; Conover, 2008; Creighton et al., 2014; Curda, 2019; 
FCBCC, 2017; FEMA, 2013a; Johnson, 2017; Kailes, 2008; Nieves, 2017). Since each 
organization has its own set of procedures, they do not know what to communicate. Liu 
and Wayne (2019), in the International Journal of Communication, highlight an essential 
trend of using social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Slack as an alternative and 
potentially more effective communication form, internally and externally. Overall, not 
setting up the right communication lines before a disaster will automatically lead to 
confusion going forward. 
f. ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering 
The issues with public works and engineering had to do with making sure fuel was 
on site, as well as the bladders to hold them, and a problem occurred twice (Creighton et 
al., 2014; King & McKay, 2006). Once the disaster hits, getting fuel is not an easy task. 
Also, with FEMA’s advance contracts, on three different occasions, some routinely needed 
requirements were not set up (Creighton et al., 2014; King & McKay, 2006; Margesson & 
Sullivan, 2019). One example is debris removal. Debris removal will always be required 
in a disaster setting. Also, with FEMA and USACE contracts, knowing which contract 
should be used would be beneficial; however, the issue of not knowing the contract 
happened twice (Creighton et al., 2014; Holland, 2019).  
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g. ESF 5: Information and Planning 
Information and planning might be the topic where issues arose most in this phase 
for AARs, next to ESF 2: Communications. Some failures included deployed personnel 
with no understanding of who was there and what their jobs were, no understanding of the 
objectives when arriving, no plans in place if different scenarios were to occur, no guidance 
on what the other organizations needed, and no understanding of what advance contracts 
were available for use (Alabama Emergency Management Agency, 2014; Besser, 2006; 
City of Marco Island, 2018; Creighton et al., 2014; Cuffari, 2020; Davis, 2019a; Galindo 
& Kennedy, 2019; Gootnick, 2019; Holland, 2019; Johnson, 2017; Judy, 2019; King & 
McKay, 2006; Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2017; Mak, 2018a, 2019; Margesson & Sullivan, 
2019; Miller et al., 2005; NEMA, 2018; Nieves, 2017; Sager, 2016; Widmann, 2017). 
These issues came up in natural disasters that ranged from hurricanes to fires from 2005–
2017 and occurred a staggering 37 times. Unfortunately, it appears none of these issues 
were fixed, and the same problems keep happening. It was not just one organization that 
had these issues; FEMA, USACE, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the director of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the assistant secretary for Community 
Planning and Development, and the National Guard all highlighted these problems in their 
AARs. Understandably, one will not have all the information before a disaster strikes; 
however, many mistakes are recurring and can potentially be fixed through appropriate 
planning before the disaster takes place. One additional point of concern brought up by 
Bartel et al. (2011) is the underutilization of FEMA’s flood zone updates. This information 
is invaluable to planners who can forecast the areas susceptible to flooding and identify 
future trends in FEMA’s flood plain analyses. 
h. ESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and 
Human Services 
Mass care, temporary housing, and human services are going to be grouped into 
one category. Some pressing issues that occurred at least four times for mass care were 
changes to the Red Cross management and organizational structure, individuals in the 
career field not knowing how to use the Mass Care Resource Management Tool, lack of 
comprehension of what the mortuary affairs mission was, and different definitions of what 
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mass care means in the various organizations (Alabama Emergency Management Agency, 
2014; FEMA, 2015; GOHSEP, 2012; Hayes, 2010; Larin, 2019). For temporary housing 
and human services, this issue occurred once: Organizations need to make sure housing is 
accessible with the right number of restrooms and a stockpile of medication (Kailes, 2008). 
People are already going to be anxious, and getting this correct makes them feel a little 
better—knowing that someone is helping during a time of need.  
i. ESF 7: Logistics 
Logistics can be considered the most complicated topic due to the number of 
organizations it takes to complete the mission. Some logistical nightmares that appeared 
21 times in the research include failing to update advance contracts, missing documentation 
regarding past performance from past vendors, failing to bring the correct CCO kits, not 
equipping organizations with the proper gear, failing to manage and track logistical 
equipment, not having suitable working spaces for the different organizations, making sure 
local vendors can still meet the requirements, and understanding the local area for all out-
of-town organizations (City of Marco Island, 2018; Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2019d; 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), 2018; FEMA, 2013a; 
Gelfeld et al., 2015; Jones, 2010; King & McKay, 2006; Lock, 2019; Mak, 2018b, 2019; 
NEMA, 2006; Widmann, 2017; Yoakum, 2017). Many issues can fall under logistics, 
which makes it difficult to understand what is needed—and even harder to classify the 
categories. One of the unique aspects of a USAF base is the airfield. The airfield not only 
serves to transport personnel, it also serves as an excellent logistics hub if roads have been 
washed out (Scott & Watson, 2018). The airfield can serve as an ideal hub for personnel to 
come in and out. With all these issues, it is understandable that it is impossible to fix 
everything, but small and steady fixes can help restore the big picture.  
j. ESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services 
Public health and medical services range from medicine to food to primary care for 
all citizens in the community. Some issues that occurred at least eight times were getting 
the right amount of immunizations for the deploying personnel and the community, 
understanding the framework of the local hospitals for the patients, coordinating food and 
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safety, deploying mental health professionals, and realigning medical command structures 
to save time and money (Christopher et al., 2005; City of Marco Island, 2018; Dodaro, 
2011; Florida Department of Health, n.d.; Gootnick, 2019; Miller et al., 2005; NEMA, 
2006). Different natural disasters can bring new medical necessities to the region, bringing 
additional hardship if not addressed and taken care of from these AARs. 
k. ESF 9: Search and Rescue and ESF 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials 
SAR and oil and hazardous materials (hazmat) are topics for which it is hard to 
grasp what is needed before a disaster strikes. For pre-disaster, these two categories are 
going to be grouped. For SAR, the one issue identified in the AARs was making sure the 
correct equipment was given out for the right scenarios (Christopher et al., 2005). The fire 
equipment will be different from the equipment for earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and 
other disasters. For oil and hazmat, the one issue was to know who oversees the program 
and where the supplies are in the regional areas (Dodaro, 2015). Knowing both topics and 
what is available is critical for the other phases. 
l. ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Agriculture and natural resources are needed for survival. Everyone needs food, 
water, and utilities. In the pre-disaster phase, communities must have the right amount of 
supplies because if the supply amount is wrong, there is no way of getting supplies in after 
the disaster, in which case the situation can become more severe (Gootnick, 2019; ICAD 
Team, 2010). This issue appeared two times in the research. Monitoring supplies and 
location is a must for mental and physical preparedness. 
m. ESF 12: Energy 
The biggest issue that occurred three times for energy was making sure there were 
enough generators for different locations (Berrick, 2009; Creighton et al., 2014; 
Department of Energy [DOE], 2005). Fuel can also be labeled under energy—including 
making sure the right contracts are in place to provide the correct fuel amount. Without 
power, it would be challenging to do many tasks on this list. 
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n. ESF 13: Public Safety and Security 
Public safety and security can be the most critical category because the government 
is there for minimal life loss. For security, it regrettably occurred once that a disaster led 
to looting (ICAD Team, 2010). Government and civilian property needs to be secure. Other 
security issues were not having the correct checkpoint procedures for base camp and having 
unauthorized personnel in secure locations (Creighton et al., 2014; Galindo & Kennedy, 
2019; Jones, 2010; NEMA, 2006).  
o. ESF 14: Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure  
Cross-sector business and infrastructure make organizations like FEMA, the Coast 
Guard, and USACE work together to ensure that responsibilities are delegated correctly 
(FEMA, 2013a; Mak, 2019). There are examples of different organizations throwing other 
organizations under the bus or pointing fingers at who needs to do what. This degrading of 
customers does not look right or help complete the mission and was documented twice in 
the research. Working together is the only way to achieve the missions.  
p. ESF 15: External Affairs 
External affairs comprise outside agencies that need to or may get involved to help 
with the mitigation, prevention, and recovery process. Issues concerning external affairs 
management occurred six times and included nonexistent NGOs, timely emergency 
declarations, different national-scale studies, and intelligence units (Conover, 2008; 
FEMA, 2013c, 2015; GOHSEP, 2012; ICAD Team, 2010; Kailes, 2008; NEMA, 2006). 
All these agencies need to be involved before the disaster, but unfortunately, they 
sometimes get left behind. Evacuation plans are occasionally minimal and do not supply 
the whole population with the right information (ICAD Team, 2010). Overall, there are 
many organizations involved in the process. They are needed to complete the mission and 
preferably de-conflict efforts to maximize each organization’s utility and minimize 
negative impacts on other organizations.  
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q. Conclusion 
Again, even though ESF 4: Firefighting did not have product information in the 104 
AARs researched, thousands of other AARs and GAO reports might have information 
related to these ESFs. Section IV.C.1 summarizes what different organizations have 
experienced with processes that can and should be changed to improve the USAF’s 
capabilities and actions in the future. It is unknown to what extent organizations take this 
information and use it, as there are multiple repeated deficiencies, but their review is 
mandated by both the CJCSM 3500.03E (JCS, 2015) and DHS’s HSEEP (FEMA, 2020c). 
Again, it is difficult to judge what will happen before a disaster, but it is better to be 
overprepared than underprepared.  
 AAR Review: Disaster 
This section is broken out by each ESF and includes the additional categories of 
finance, manpower, and training. This section provides the qualitative analysis identified 
within the context of actions taken from the day of the disaster notification to the disaster 
occurring to mitigate, prepare, or prevent impacts from the disaster. The authors excluded 
ESF 4: Firefighting; ESF 5: Information and Planning; ESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency 
Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services; ESF 8: Public Health and Medical 
Services; ESF 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response; ESF 13: Public Safety and 
Security; and ESF 14: Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure from this section because 
trends were not identified within the 104 AARs researched aside from the issues already 
discussed in the pre-disaster section.  
a. Finance 
Figuring out the finances when a disaster is occurring is complicated. There are 
pictures of a tornado going through a town with one home being destroyed while the one 
next to it is only missing a couple of shingles. Accurately estimating costs during the 
disaster is difficult, but agencies are starting to understand better what to expect through 
database management (Currie, 2019c; Kailes, 2008). Not having the correct cost estimators 
occurred two times. The overall trend was estimating the costs accurately, but with finance, 
estimations are all the customer has until the quotes arrive. 
77 
b. Manpower 
For manpower, all the issues with pre-disaster are the same during the disaster 
phase. The only added problem that arose was that FEMA staffing during the disaster was 
incomplete (Currie, 2020c; FEMA, 2015), and the staff that was deployed did not have the 
proper training (FEMA, 2013a). These issues occurred three times. Initiating deployments 
during a disaster is an interesting concept and a process that should be carefully considered 
due to its propensity to making the situation more complicated.  
c. Training 
Training had one issue during the disaster phase; challenges arose when conducting 
on-the-job training during the disaster (Conover, 2008; Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 
2020c). These training issues occurred in three different AARs. Again, as stated in the 
previous ESF, while accomplishing necessary tasks for a disaster is not the ideal time to 
train. One will never have all the information, but this is another process that should be 
done pre-disaster.  
d. ESF 1: Transportation 
Transportation during a disaster is difficult due to the need to ensure the safety of 
the deployed personnel. However, some issues that came up were that the mission-essential 
personnel could not enter the base, the routes to needed locations were shut down, and the 
advance contracts were not readily available to remove vehicles for logistical purposes 
(Creighton et al., 2014; ICAD Team, 2010; Jones, 2010). The transportation issues 
occurred a total of four times. It should be noted that deployed personnel should not move 
during a disaster, and transportation should be a last resort. Maybe this thought process 
should become a regulation to ease up logistics and improve safety. 
e. ESF 2: Communications 
Communication problems only get worse when a disaster strikes. All the issues that 
arose during the pre-disaster phase amplified during this phase. Some new issues were a 
complete loss of communications and infrastructure, single points of failure, a lack of 
contingency plans for non-U.S. territories and the U.S. deployed personnel was unable to 
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assist, and organizations having unreasonable or nonexistent time lines to get 
communications back up and running (Christopher et al., 2005; FEMA, 2015; ICAD Team, 
2010; Imlay, 2018; NEMA, 2018; Widmann, 2017). A total of nine issues occurred within 
these examples. Communications will go down during a disaster; that is a fact. However, 
having reasonable expectations will help maintain normalcy.  
f. ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering 
During the disaster, public works and engineering issues included having downed 
power lines and trees, thereby causing power outages, and having no guidelines in place to 
handle requests and prioritize them (Creighton et al., 2014; USACE, 2010; Yoakum, 2017). 
Three times these issues occurred during these different disasters. Downed power lines and 
trees are expected during the disaster phase and cannot be stopped. However, prioritizing 
requests should be handled before the disaster, and there is plenty of data from past 
disasters to help rank these requests.  
g. ESF 7: Logistics and ESF 12: Energy 
Logistics and energy had one new issue brought up, and it is significant: having 
generators (DOE, 2005; FCBCC, 2017; FEMA, 2015; Florida Department of Health, n.d.; 
Imlay, 2018; Mak, 2019; NEMA, 2006). A total of seven issues with generators occurred. 
During some of these disasters, there were not enough generators for traffic lights, shelters, 
and other facilities. Some of the provided generators came with batteries that were not 
charged and could not be recharged, which rendered them useless. The storm damaged 
antennas and communication towers, and other power outages led to technology failures 
that affected the energy category. These problems were a logistical nightmare. Once the 
power goes out, especially in hospitals, lives are in danger. Where technology is heading 
in the future, not having electricity will hinder progress. Having workable generators 
cannot be forgotten. 
h. ESF 9: Search and Rescue 
SAR missions start to intensify in this stage. This category’s main issue was making 
sure the geo-location on responders’ smartphones worked to be able to find the people who 
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need rescuing (DHS, 2020d). This issue occurred once in the research. These people are 
the frontline workers that are putting their lives on the line. Making sure their equipment 
is functional is a must. 
i. ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Meal preparation during the disaster was the only issue in the agriculture and 
natural resources category (FCBCC, 2017; ICAD Team, 2010). The issues with meal 
preparation occurred twice. Having hot meals during a disaster is highly unlikely. Having 
meals ready to eat (MREs) and unitized group rations (UGRs) will be needed during the 
disaster. These are meals that do not require electricity or can be cooked in hot water. Meals 
are a must, but this is where quality can be diminished for survival. 
j. ESF 15: External Affairs 
External affairs issues ranged from getting information from outside actors like the 
volunteer fire departments and rescue squads, ensuring the intelligence units have the 
correct equipment, and making sure the rescue dogs are safe (Alabama Emergency 
Management Agency, 2014; Conover, 2008; FEMA, 2015). These vastly different external 
affairs issues occurred three times. This category’s problems might not directly prevent the 
contracting personnel from completing their work; however, requirements might come in 
from these organizations. Overall, these issues are alarming and can be overwhelming with 
the number of people involved. Still, if everyone is organized and prepared for the disaster, 
the job will be more comfortable. 
k. Conclusion 
ESF 5: Information and Planning and ESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 
Temporary Housing, and Human Services categories did not have new issues that arose 
during the disaster phase, just recurring issues. The problems during the pre-disaster phase 
continue throughout the three phases. The categories in this section that did not have 
problems stated in the AARs were ESF 4: Firefighting, ESF 10: Oil and Hazmat Material 
Response, ESF 13: Public Safety and Security, and ESF 14: Cross-Sector Business and 
Infrastructure. This does not mean that there are no issues in these categories. There are 
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hundreds of AARs written after disasters, and there will always be issues; however, in the 
AARs researched for this project, there were no deficient trends identified.  
 AAR Review: Post-Disaster 
This section is broken out by each ESF, as well as the additional finance and 
manpower categories. This section provides the qualitative analysis identified within the 
context of actions taken after the disaster has occurred in order to mitigate, prevent, and 
recover from the disaster’s impacts. The authors excluded the training category, ESF 2: 
Communications, ESF 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response, ESF 11: Agriculture 
and Natural Resources, ESF 13: Public Safety and Security, and ESF 14: Cross-Sector 
Business and Infrastructure in this section because trends were not identified within the 
104 AARs researched or the issues repeated from the pre-disaster and disaster section. 
a. Finance 
After surveying the damage, there is a better grasp of how much money is needed 
to rebuild. However, getting those cost estimates is one of the issues that occurred five 
times during the post-disaster phase (Currie, 2019b, 2019c; Johnson, 2017; Jones, 2010; 
Kailes, 2008). Federal buildings are not the only infrastructure damaged, and the 
government cannot force a contractor to bid on the federal government property first. The 
other issue is making sure funds are available, and this was a problem that occurred six 
times. One cannot award a contract without funds, and even if funds were available, the 
funds assigned to the line of accounting ran out very quickly, or funds never arrived 
(Currie, 2016a, 2020b; Garcia-Diaz, 2019; Johnson, 2017; Jones, 2010; Rusco, 2020). Six 
times, projects were given the authority to proceed but never received funds and were in 
limbo for years (Currie, 2016a, 2020b; Johnson, 2017; Jones, 2010; Kailes, 2008; Rusco, 
2020). Furthermore, there were three times when tracking the finances was overly 
challenging because no files or paperwork were linked to the funds (Currie, 2016a; Jones, 




In 2017, manpower was a significant issue. When the multiple hurricanes and 
wildfires coincided, three occurrences were found when there was insufficient manpower 
at all locations (Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2019d; FCBCC, 2017). When personnel was 
already on the scene, it was challenging to get more or transfer them to a different location; 
that occurred four times (Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2019d; FCBCC, 2017; Urban, 
2017). On one occasion, organizations needed to make sure that when meetings occurred, 
only essential personnel were present for the decision-making process (FEMA, 2015). The 
final issue, documented twice, involved insufficient oversight over requirements validation 
to consolidate purchase requests and minimize duplicate purchases (Creighton et al., 2014; 
Currie, 2019c).  
c. ESF 1: Transportation 
Transportation restoration was the most significant issue discovered throughout the 
AARs and was explicitly identified in three reports (Creighton et al., 2014; Jones, 2010; 
NEMA, 2018). Even with functional vehicles, there is no guarantee that the roads, paths, 
and other transportation routes are useable. Road debris, airfield damage, and seaport 
damage are significant barriers to success within the transportation ESF. During recovery, 
which areas, agencies, etcetera need priority, and which agency gets to decide? While the 
local community may prioritize property damage surveys, the federal government may 
indicate road and transportation infrastructure as more critical to more effectively manage 
the area’s damage. This issue demonstrates the importance of a single board or position 
(i.e., JP 4-10’s [JCS, 2019b] joint acquisition review board [JARB] or FEMA’s primary 
ESF agency) to make the prioritization list and disseminate it pre-disaster and then 
communicate with the affected stakeholders throughout recovery. Surprisingly, runway 
repair was not mentioned within the AARs, and yet it can be an invaluable resource, 
especially if there is warehouse space available on a USAF base.  
d. ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering 
Public works and engineering issues were mostly with equipment, worksites, and 
personnel. Some of the equipment shortages recorded on three separate occasions were 
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sandbags, CCO deployment kits, satellite communication radios, and cell phones (FEMA, 
2013a; Johnson, 2017; USACE, 2010). It was not easy for some of the engineers to 
complete the mission without this. There were shortages for some of the items, but it is 
also the individual’s responsibility to deploy with the correct equipment. Again, simple 
resources like tarps and tents were scarce, which was an issue on time in the research 
(Johnson, 2017). Not having the correct number of worksites to put debris meant that sites 
would fill up quickly, and there would be no other site in place to put the debris, or the sites 
were not fully permitted for use (Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2019a; FCBCC, 2017); this 
occurred three times. When switching people out, there was not adequate turnover, or the 
new individual was not as experienced, which faltered the mission (Currie, 2018b; FEMA, 
2013a; Holland, 2019). This final issue occurred on three different occasions.  
e. ESF 4: Firefighting 
Post-disaster is the only stage where firefighting had issues or was even brought 
up. The problem was getting new uniforms or having the correct gear at the location 
(Creighton et al., 2014). For example, rescue teams during an earthquake had to use 
construction-style helmets instead of firefighting helmets. Firefighters are not just there to 
put out fires; they have other skill sets in their portfolio. However, who should provide the 
equipment is an interesting question. Firefighter equipment is bulky and can get damaged. 
It does make sense to have stockpiles at different locations because this equipment does 
not expire. 
f. ESF 5: Information and Planning 
When reviewing information and planning issues, one critical point was deploying 
personnel to perform their assigned jobs. Preferably, the personnel should be highly 
proficient due to the demanding environment. The one recurring issue was that the FEMA 
press officer was not knowledgeable about what was occurring. When asked questions 
about the progress of medical operations or when other information about the disaster was 
requested, no concrete answers were given. There was no control of the media; media 
personnel were walking in restricted sections without permission, and the press officer was 
not controlling who was getting interviewed (Miller et al., 2005). A recurring problem was 
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that information about contracts, payments, state and local official reports, hazards, and 
changes in the mission was not documented (Currie, 2015, 2016b, 2018a, 2019d; Fekete et 
al., 2019; Galindo & Kennedy, 2019; Gelfeld et al., 2015; Jones, 2010; Mak, 2019; NEMA, 
2018; Widmann, 2017). This issue was reported on 11 different occasions. Not 
documenting this information upfront will make the closeout stage of the mission more 
complicated. Additionally, memory fades and even more so in such a chaotic atmosphere 
as a disaster. Verbal agreements, SF44s, and other non-technology based actions may be 
missed without regular journal type updates. Advance contracts to source supplies and 
services strategically relies primarily on accurate data within the disaster environment. 
There needs to be a validation system in place in order to capture not only the contract 
actions automatically captured in FPDS-NG, but the manual contracts and micro-purchase 
threshold purchases as well, preferably in one system.  
g. ESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and 
Human Services 
Having a stockpile of medicine, enough space for mortuary affairs, a shortage of 
temporary housing, and uncertainty regarding the local agreements between voluntary 
organizations for what services they provide were the main issues that occurred six times 
for mass care, emergency assistance, temporary housing, and human services (Creighton 
et al., 2014; Currie, 2020b; Kailes, 2008; Larin, 2019; Miller et al., 2005). This uncertainty 
makes it hard to judge for stockpile because, unlike firefighter suits, medicine expires. 
Having too little can lead to death, while too much can lead to biohazard issues. Mortuary 
affairs is another difficult task because the numbers will never be the same. Some tornadoes 
kill hundreds while some kill none. Electricity is needed to keep bodies, which is another 
issue of having enough generators. The same can be said about housing because it is 
uncertain what infrastructures will be intact after a disaster. FEMA’s 2017 review noted 
that shelters for Hurricane Harvey were in use for more than 60 days, leading to 
underplanned shelter maintenance and manpower contracts (Long, 2018). For the local 
agreements, this is an issue the provincial government should figure out. Unfortunately, 
the problems cannot be fixed with this category due to the uncertainties of what will occur.  
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h. ESF 7: Logistics 
Logistics was the category with the most extensive list of issues in this phase. 
Surprisingly, the long list of topics was relatively repetitive, and incidents occurred a total 
of 15 times. If the same problems have been happening since 2005, one could ask, what is 
the point of the AARs if no one is paying attention to them? The recurring issues were 
difficulties replenishing and tracking supplies, advance contracts that were not prepared 
because the information was scarce, and contracts that were not filed correctly or lost 
(Creighton et al., 2014; Currie, 2019d; HSGAC, 2018; FCBCC, 2017; FEMA, 2013a, 
2013c; Johnson, 2017; King & McKay, 2006; Mak, 2019; NEMA, 2006). Replenishing 
supplies can be difficult due to transportation delays, and the same can be said for tracking 
the supplies. Advance contracts are logistically run by FEMA, with very few organizations 
understanding how the contracts were awarded or how to use them. Unfortunately, FEMA 
does not have a good record of giving their logistical information to others for use, even 
though they have been faulted multiple times for it in congressional hearings. If FEMA 
were to provide guides to use the advance contracts as hyperlinks on their current advance 
contract website (FEMA, 2020a), the federal government may drastically decrease the 
number of contract actions while streamlining other organizations’ processes utilizing 
those contracts per the Economy Act’s (2020) instructions  in FAR 17.502-2. In the 2017 
Hurricane Season FEMA After Action Report (Imlay, 2018), one of the highlighted issues 
was the lack of supply chain management knowledge and a lack of planning for the 
transportation and management of contracted support. Last, contract file management is a 
core competency of contracting personnel. Without the documentation, the contracts 
appear to have never existed. Missing documentation leads to the logistical nightmare of 
contract closeout, termination, and addressing claims against the government. The post-
disaster phase will be hectic. If organizations do not want to make the situation more 
chaotic, they must address and correct these recurring issues plaguing the federal 
government for over 15 years. 
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i. ESF 8: Public Health and Medical 
The authors identified the following issues within this topic: having the correct life 
support items, tracking medical supply purchases, misunderstanding agencies’ public 
health and medical capabilities, and knowing what resources are available in the local area 
(Denigan-Macauley, 2020; Florida Department of Health, n.d.; NEMA, 2006). Some of the 
life support items that were in short supply were ice, water, and food. Even knowing about 
this short supply, the federal government had difficulty establishing the correct supply 
channel. Even worse, the federal government, in several instances, actively reduced several 
supply channels. It is advisable for contracting personnel to have this information, even 
though it is the customer’s responsibility to track their supplies. The base necessities, such 
as food, water, and shelter, need to have the shortest supply chains in terms of time. 
Knowing the local area’s supply can de-conflict agencies’ priorities and ensure the 
appropriate rationing of critical supplies. Advance contracts can help prioritize these vital 
supplies by delegating ordering authority to specific agencies for each contract.  
j. ESF 9: Search and Rescue  
SAR is utilized the most in this phase. The main issue was that while the military, 
fire crew, and volunteers were on site, they were sometimes deployed late to handle or help 
the situation—also, the standard operating procedures needed to be established beforehand 
(Creighton et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2005). The issue only occurred twice, which is a good 
thing because this category is critical due to the primary mission of going into dangerous 
situations to save lives. 
k. ESF 12: Energy 
Issues with energy deals occurred twice: Energy providers failed to assess the 
damage and see what could be done for the future to save energy and prevent injury 
(Berrick, 2009; FEMA, 2005). Two hurricanes caused roughly $3.9 billion in electrical 
services damage, and some of the repairs were only temporary (Rusco, 2020). The authors 
noted that within CONUS, the power grid was normally repaired within weeks; however, 
that is still weeks where generators will be in extremely high demand throughout the 
impacted areas. As the U.S. continues to update its electrical grid, it will be interesting to 
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see the effects climate change will have on the reliability and recoverability of the 
infrastructure (Campbell, 2018). 
l. ESF 15: External Affairs 
During this phase, many of the external affairs had to do with the 2017 hurricanes 
that affected Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Issues arose due to the different 
jurisdictions, distance from the United States, outdated local infrastructure, amount of 
personnel deployed due to capacity constraints, and local preparedness being poor (Currie, 
2018b; Kailes, 2008; Mak, 2019; NEMA, 2018). A total of 10 issues were recorded in this 
category. These issues should not be a surprise because of the unusual laws and regulations 
between the United States and Puerto Rico. Another problem happened with the Coast 
Guard. There is no formal process for the Coast Guard to get involved in the disaster 
process. With many of the disasters taking place in the water, it would make sense to get 
the Coast Guard involved. Although these locations were OCONUS, as the CONUS 
infrastructure ages, the deployments to disaster-hit areas may become more complicated. 
These lessons can be applied even in a different environment.  
m. Conclusion 
There were no new issues with the training category, ESF 2: Communications, ESF 
10: Oil and Hazmat, ESF 13: Public Safety and Security, and ESF 14: Cross-Sector 
Business and Infrastructure. All issues in these categories are recurring issues that were 
brought up in the pre-disaster and disaster categories. The category in this section that did 
not have problems stated in the AARs was ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Although not addressed again within the post-disaster section, the TTX will need to 
continue the trends throughout its three modules (pre-disaster, during the disaster, and post-
disaster). The information below outlines recurring issues in the post-disaster phase. 
Organizations can train to improve after disaster recovery is completed, but training 
should not be happening in the post-disaster phase (Galindo & Kennedy, 2019). The AARs 
will reflect the mistakes throughout the whole process, and that is where new training 
material should come from to supplement the current training objectives.  
87 
With communications, expect there to be bandwidth issues and communication 
blackouts for days (Christopher et al., 2005; Creighton et al., 2014; FEMA, 2015; Galindo 
& Kennedy, 2019; Jones, 2010; NEMA, 2006; Obayuwana & Lockett, 2010; Widmann, 
2017). This issue should not be a surprise but still occurred eight times in this phase. When 
dealing with email communication or just talking to one another, communication has 
always been a problem in the military and in the federal government.  
For oil and hazmat, the objective is to make sure resources like oil and fuel are 
readily available and to ensure that hazardous material is taken care of, which poses a 
problem in one of the AARs (Dodaro, 2015). Out of all the categories, the oil and hazmat 
had the least information. A possible explanation is that contracting and the other 
organizations writing the AARs do not directly deal in this category.  
There were two reported agriculture and natural resources issues with making sure 
meals were prepared and water was available (FCBCC, 2017; ICAD Team, 2010). 
Additionally, there was concern that if a tornado hits the Midwest, it will be harder for the 
farmers to get their agricultural stockpile back to where it was before.  
For public safety and security, the looting that occurred happened twice in the 
reports because people are opportunists (ICAD Team, 2010; NEMA, 2006). This issue is 
perhaps the biggest issue for security and keeping the public safe. For cross-sector business 
and infrastructure, it is anyone’s guess what will be readily available or when damaged 
infrastructure can be reused again (Currie, 2018b; FEMA, 2013a). Public safety and 
security is another category that is hard to judge, and knowing what is needed can only be 
discovered once the disaster passes. 
 Conclusion 
Even though not all information is needed in the USAF to complete missions, 
knowing what other organizations must accomplish will allow the USAF to understand the 
bigger picture. When reading the categories and the issues, one might think that these issues 
and categories are not crucial to contracting personnel. This notion is incorrect. All these 
categories can impact what contracting requirements may come before a contracting 
officer. While it is true that some of these issues might not affect contracting when they 
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first happen, there is a trickle-down effect that can get contracting involved. There are 
many issues; however, there will always be issues. Changes can be made and should be 
made, especially concerning issues that have persisted across the federal government for 
over a decade. 
D. HURRICANE MICHAEL PURCHASE REVIEW AND POTENTIAL ESF 
REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, the authors analyze and pull actual historical contract actions 
captured in the FPDS–NG database for Hurricane Michael (GSA, 2020b). The authors then 
identify potential requirements based on FEMA’s ESFs, DOD responsibilities, and the 
requirements that utilized advance contracts already in existence versus stand-alone 
contracts. This purchase history will be broken into the ESFs that have been identified 
above. For this project, we focused on the Hurricane Michael DOD expenditures only. 
However, in future research, it would be useful to have an integrated FEMA, DHS, and 
DOD requirements breakdown that includes trend analysis of hurricane purchases if the 
DOD continues to take a larger part in disaster recovery (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Disaster Recovery Participation Between DHS and DOD in the 
Past 15 Years (Minimum 100 Contract Actions). Adapted from 
GSA (2020). 
Hurricanes with 
















Michael 2018 233 $559 million 29% 60% 
Florence 2018 210 $139 million 27% 55% 
Harvey 2017 463 $198 million 12.5% 83% 
Sandy 2012 912 $1.39 billion 47% 25% 
Rita 2005 1,411 $797 million 28% 19% 
Katrina 2005 9,439 $7.9 billion 23% 45% 
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The FPDS–NG database provides multiple data points regarding the purchasing 
tactics of the DOD. The first data point the authors look at is how the DOD acquired 
supplies and services by reviewing the method of procurement (i.e., stand-alone contracts 
versus task orders and blanket purchase agreement calls), the method of competition (i.e., 
8[a] sole source or full and open competition), and how scope increase or decrease 
modifications were created (i.e., change order or supplemental). The second data point the 
authors look at is the vendor pool and whether the vendors are associated with an advance 
contract or not.  
Within this dataset, 233 of the 802 contract actions were attributed to a DOD 
contracting agency:  
• Defense Commissary Agency (DECA; nine contract actions) 
• Defense Information System Agency (DISA; one contract action) 
• DLA (15 contract actions) 
• USAF (38 contract actions) 
• USA (136 contract actions) 
• U.S. Navy (USN; 33 contract actions)  
The USAF had four offices identified within the 38 contracts: 28 CONS specialized 
flight (PKS) out of Ellsworth AFB, SD; 325 CONS plans and programs flight (PKP) out 
of Tyndall AFB, FL; Air Combat Command’s Acquisition Management and Integration 
Center out of Langley AFB, VA; and the 772 Enterprise Sourcing Squadron out of Wright-
Patterson, AFB, OH. Although the TTX may be run by only one base, it is essential to 
remember that even within just the USAF, the squadrons are unlikely to be the only 
acquisition personnel involved.  
Of the 233 DOD contract actions, there were 88 awards and 145 modifications. Of 
the 88 awards, 30 were stand-alone contracts (no referenced indefinite delivery vehicle 
procurement instrument identifier [IDV PIID]) and 58 were task orders and blanket 
90 
purchase agreement (BPA) calls. The next two subsections provide details on the stand-
alone contracts and the task orders.  
a. Hurricane Michael Stand-Alone Contracts 
All 15 of DLA’s contract actions were stand-alone contracts for fuel between two 
contractors: Indigo Energy Partners (DUNS: 827489183) and Tayrona Investments, LLC 
(DUNS: 832317973). DECA had one stand-alone contract for roll-off dumpsters from 
Dumpster Services, LLC (DUNS: 081501098). The USA used 8(a) sole sourcing for two 
stand-alone contracts, which are both available as task orders: modular dorms with 
Modular Concepts, Inc. (DUNS: 016538643)—for just less than $4 million—and a 
$199,999.99 initial assessment of Tyndall’s hospital with SES Electrical, LLC. The USN 
had four stand-alone contracts, all using FAR 6.302-2 (2020) sole source procedures to 
procure building repair from Rubb, Inc. (DUNS: 101190106) and DMR Consulting, Inc. 
(DUNS: 069417405); internet service from COPASAT, LLC (DUNS: 079382646); and 
photography equipment from Adorama, Inc. (DUNS: 087403499). The USAF awarded 
eight contracts, which are detailed in Table 8, four of which were completed under 
simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) and one under a set-aside for a service-disabled 
veteran–owned small business (SDVOSB). 
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Table 8. USAF Methods of Purchase for Non-Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) Contracts. Adapted from GSA (2020). 
 
 
There were 24 modifications to the 30 stand-alone contracts. DLA had one no-cost 
modification. The USA had one modification to extend the period of performance. The 
USN had one supplemental modification to a shipbuilding contract in Alabama for 
damages due to the hurricane and one exercise option for additional repairs to a facility. 
The USAF had 17 modifications. There were two terminations for convenience, four 
funding only modifications, and two administrative actions. There were six supplemental 
agreements and three change orders, which involved a mix of changing contracts awarded 
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before the hurricane to account for the hurricane’s impact and changing newly awarded 
contracts for what appears to be unforeseen site conditions (i.e., the damage was worse 
than expected or more time was needed). 
Of the 73 new awards, 41% were stand-alone contracts, which takes more time than 
awarding task orders and increases the number of entities working within the disaster 
environment, adding to the confusion. Even when the DLA is taken out of the data pool, 
25% of the contracts awarded by DOD agencies were stand-alone contracts. Reducing this 
data point is essential for construction materials and services, including debris removal, 
which is in high demand during a disaster and requires careful allocation by the 
government. There are finite construction supplies in the local area. The prioritization 
should not be left to the local base but a higher level—USNORTHCOM and FEMA—
emphasizing the use of advance contracts for these services (Mak, 2018a).  
b. Hurricane Michael Task Orders and BPA Calls 
Of the 58 task orders, there were 32 different IDIQs used with 32 other vendors. 
The award amounts ranged from DECA’s $1,550 task order for kitchen supplies to USAF’s 
$293,000,000 task order for facilities operation support.  
DECA awarded three task orders for A&E services and one for kitchen supplies. 
The USA awarded 35 task orders. There were three building assessments, one building 
repair, one demolition, two planning debris removal, 13 debris removal, and four roofing 
repairs. The USAF awarded two financial support service task orders, one repair perimeter 
fence, three runway repair task orders, one facility maintenance, and three communications 
task orders for internet access and radios. The USN awarded nine task orders: one for ship 
recovery, five for building recovery, one for furniture replacement, one for debris removal, 
and one for refuse and dumpster services. Other than DECA’s kitchen supply, which was 
below the micro-purchase threshold ($5,000), none of these awards were surprising. In the 
next section, the authors compare the stand-alone contract awards with the task orders to 
identify potential preplanned task orders to reduce stand-alone contracts further, or—at the 
very least—improve the USAF’s ability to be proactive versus reactive.  
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There were a total of 120 modifications attributed to task orders during this disaster. 
There was two additional work bilateral agreements, 19 change orders, one definitized 
change order, six funding only, 58 administrative only, and 34 supplemental agreements 
for work within scope. During a disaster, agility is an essential trait of the contracting 
officer, best exemplified by the number of modifications versus awards. It is important to 
note that the preponderance of modifications was attributed to the increased scope and 
revised quantities, which is unsurprising during a disaster that inherently contains 
unforeseen site conditions. The authors suggest further research into the effectiveness of 
different contract actions during a disaster, as it is outside this project’s scope.  
c. Did Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracts Exist for the Stand-
Alone Contracts? 
The purpose of Table 9 is to inform the reader whether an IDIQ contract exists for 
each of the DOD’s awarded stand-alone contracts. Except for three, there were enterprise-
wide contracts available. It would be surprising if there were no concrete BPA in existence 
at the local base, as there would typically be a repeating commodity requirement for the 
concrete for repairs to the roads and runways on the base. This information should help 
guide the TTX’s objective to identify the existing IDIQs and BPAs at the enterprise scale 
and develop new IDIQs and BPAs at the local level to fill any requirement gaps.  
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Table 9. Which Stand-Alone Contracts Had Potential Advanced Contracts 
Available? Adapted from GSA (2020).  
DOD stand-alone 
contract 








HDEC0519P0004 Dumpster Rental DECA Yes  Yes 
SPE60519P8628 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8629 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8635 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8636 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8637 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8641 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8650 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8652 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8658 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8659 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8667 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8668 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8679 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8693 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 
SPE60519P8709 Fuel DLA No Yes, with DLA 













FA481919CA004 Facility Services USAF Yes Yes 
FA481919PA002 Roofing USAF Yes Yes 




























N6133119P0003 Building Repair USN Yes Yes 
N6133119P0005 Building Repair USN Yes Yes 










d. Purchase Analysis Within the ESF Context 
The purpose of Table 10 is to demonstrate that the DOD already acts within many 
of FEMA’s ESFs, even if not directly for FEMA. This information will help immensely 
when filling in for FEMA’s potential capacity gaps; however, being prepared before the 
tasking is just as important, demonstrated by the numerous stand-alone contracts that could 
have been addressed through advance contracts.  
Table 10. Enterprise-Level Contract Support Used by DOD During 
Hurricane Michael. Adapted from GSA (2020). 
ESF Actual Enterprise-Level Contract Support 
Used in a Hurricane 
1 – Transportation No 
2 – Communications Yes – internet, cell service 
3 – Public Works and Engineering Yes – A&E services, debris removal, and so on 
4 – Firefighting No 
5 – Information and Planning Yes – debris removal planning, building repair 
planning 
6 – Mass Care, Emergency 
Assistance, Temporary Housing, 
and Human Services 
Yes – modular dorms, hospital repair 
7 – Logistics Yes – planning, runway repairs 
8 – Public Health and Medical 
Services 
Yes – hospital repair 
9 – Search and Rescue No 
10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials 
Response 
Yes – debris removal 
11 – Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
No 
12 – Energy Yes – fuel 
13 – Public Safety and Security Yes – fencing repair 
14 – Cross-Sector Business and 
Infrastructure 
Yes – all 
15 – External Affairs Yes – external road repair 
 
e. Additional Hurricane Michael Notes 
Additional contract action charts and the Hurricane Michael warnings and watches 
time line can be found in Appendix D: Hurricane Michael FPDS-NG Award and 
96 
Modification Time Line. These charts demonstrate the importance of pre-disaster planning 
and recovery plans. Table 14, in Appendix D, illustrates the brevity of the time period 
between hurricane notice and hurricane ending, which would be the three-phase approach’s 
disaster phase. For this Category 5 hurricane, Florida had a warning 3 days before landfall 
and potentially 5 days prior if planners considered warnings for Mexico or other nearby 
locations. Additionally, the preponderance of contract actions took place after landfall. One 
potential issue with this data is whether or not verbal agreements were in place in lieu of 
formalized contracts between the first warning, October 6, and landfall, October 10 (Berg 
et al., 2019, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2019).  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This analysis first identified potential objectives that the USAF should utilize when 
creating a CONUS HADR TTX. Within the objectives, the authors first synthesized the 
three separate USAF contracting CFETPs into one HADR-centric list of objectives in 
Appendix A. Next, the authors sifted through the JMTL in the DOD’s UTDT system to 
create a HADR list of USAF objectives from the DOD perspective, found in Appendix B. 
Last, the authors reviewed 104 AARs for lessons learned and best practices. These 
objectives should be utilized to ensure that the USAF’s CCOs and personnel are better 
prepared to deal with the ever-increasing disasters within CONUS. 
The second part of the analysis focused on potential DOD requirements that the 
CONUS HADR TTX should use to achieve the identified objectives through the 
consolidated FPDS–NG Hurricane Michael disaster purchase database. Each objective 
should be matched to a requirement, or if no requirement currently exists, a requirement 
should be created to simulate the potential occasion. A lesson requirement centered around 
the award of an 8(a) sole-source contract within the disaster recovery/post-disaster phase 
(mirroring Hurricane Michael) can meet multiple possible lesson objectives. This includes 
but is not limited to understanding 8(a) procedures, understanding potential supply chain 
issues (i.e., addressing the importance of identifying who the 8[a]’s matched prime 
contractor is and if that prime contractor is already a prime contractor that FEMA is 
planning to utilize), and understanding solicitation procedures. One requirement that the 
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authors did not directly find but believe is immensely useful is identifying the USAF base’s 
capability to provide warehousing and logistics support to FEMA, and whether the USAF 
base can support the local government with those same capabilities.  
Finally, suppose the USAF can incorporate external players within their TTX 
including a USNORTHCOM point of contact, the local FEMA planning point of contact, 
and other bases’ purchasing offices within proximity. In that case, the government can gain 
a competitive advantage by de-conflicting their internal competitions. The ESFs and the 
JMTLs can help inform potential and actual roles and responsibilities. Further application 
of this analysis is covered in Chapter V.  
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This chapter provides the authors’ conclusions derived from the analysis performed 
in Chapter IV. The first section of the chapter addresses the five questions posed in Chapter 
I Section C. After answering the five questions, the authors provide five recommendations 
to AFICC in regards to TTX exercises and training in the future. The authors then provide 
additional areas for research that may bolster this MBA project’s analysis and outputs. 
Finally, the authors summarize the chapter.  
A. CONCLUSIONS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This MBA project focused on designing a TTX for the USAF regarding a HADR 
event. The authors drew several conclusions from their analysis, which is discussed within 
the following paragraphs and captured in the authors’ suggested TTX design in Appendix 
E. This answer to the primary question is broken into a three-stage approach to the HADR 
event: pre-disaster conclusions, during disaster conclusions, and post-disaster conclusions. 
After addressing the conclusions for the primary question, the secondary questions are 
addressed. 
1. How should the USAF design the next CONUS HADR TTX? 
Due to the differences between JP 4-10 and FEMA’s framework, the authors 
synthesized the two frameworks into a three-phased approach: pre-disaster, disaster, and 
post-disaster. During the pre-disaster phase, also known as Phase 0 in military jargon, 
several crucial steps must be taken to minimize the inherent confusion within a disaster 
and maximize local contractors’ capacity while de-conflicting with other government 
stakeholders. During this phase, incorporating stakeholder analysis, reviewing the roles 
and responsibilities of those stakeholders, advancing contract identification, conducting 
financial planning, and analyzing the capability gap must be incorporated within the TTX 
to maximize its effectiveness. A TTX that helps minimize the confusion of the 
stakeholders’ mission sets should improve effective communication by identifying the 
proper stakeholders. The TTX should also address reducing the confusion of finances, 
improving the awareness of acquisition options (i.e., local area set aside versus advance 
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contracts), and identifying the potential additional mission gaps of higher-ranking 
organizations (i.e., USNORTHCOM and FEMA). By addressing these topics, the local 
CONS will significantly improve their ability to recover from a HADR event while 
ensuring that they do not hinder the external stakeholders’ mission sets.  
From the first day of notification to the disaster ending (i.e., recovery begins), the 
plans put in place during the pre-disaster phase will “turn-on” and begin the reaction phase. 
There are mitigation strategies that can be turned on, such as sandbag purchase and 
placement. Additionally, discussions with the contractors with advanced contracts (e.g., 
for airfield repair and road repair) can ensure that they are notified to be ready on standby. 
These actions can supplement or augment the local CES if they have limited capacity or 
are incapacitated. These discussions should include external stakeholders to prioritize the 
contractor’s actions in the disaster environment. Hopefully structured and planned during 
the pre-disaster phase, communication needs to be focused on what damage occurs and 
keeping all appropriate stakeholders in the loop. Communication contingencies include 
having a local LMR setup for the base and a plan to stay in communication with state and 
local officials to improve situational awareness. 
When the disaster ends, the recovery stage begins, and any planning weakness will 
become readily apparent. Creating an exercise that demonstrates the lessons learned in the 
AARs and other disaster analyses can help reinforce the importance of careful planning in 
the pre-disaster phase. Performing market research at this phase will be excessively 
difficult due to the inherent chaos discussed throughout the paper, as will formulating a 
communications plan when stakeholders are already focused on recovering. This project’s 
AAR review highlighted the importance of planning and the relative ease of planning with 
the copious amount of analyses published from the GAO, educational institutions, and 
FPDS–NG’s disaster database.  
Overall, the suggested TTX design reinforces successful habits highlighted in the 
AARs and addresses the deficiency trends identified. After using Appendix E and 
reviewing Chapter IV, the reader should be better informed on designing an exercise that 
will improve planning, preparation, and actions during a HADR event. 
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2. Can the DOD’s CJCSM 3500.03 and the DHS’s HSEEP be synthesized to 
align the federal government’s approach to CONUS disaster training? If 
so, how? 
In Chapter III, the authors combined the HSEEP and CJCSM 3500.03E into one 
framework to align their research with the federal government’s method of creating 
exercises. As FEMA is the federal agency in charge during a disaster, and the DOD’s 
framework falls in line with the FEMA framework—specifically the NIMS and the AFI 
10–2501 (AFCEC, 2020)—the authors decided to subordinate the DOD to FEMA for this 
TTX recommendation. The language used between the two documents is inconsistent at 
best. The authors advise correcting or, at the very least, providing the equivalent positions 
and vocabulary necessary to improve communications between the two agencies. A 
common theme in the AARs was a failure to communicate correctly. This starts with 
aligning the design, training, and vocabulary of personnel for disaster management.  
3. What do the AARs and GAO reports identify as common discrepancies, 
and can requirements and task objectives be incorporated to reduce the 
trends? 
The AARs and GAO reports are a treasure trove of lessons learned. These reports 
can aid in trend identification, from inherent communication issues (power outages) to 
communication issues (identifying stakeholders) to financial planning problems (confused 
lines of accounting awareness and disaster threshold awareness). These lessons and trends 
are reasonably easy to incorporate into a TTX as it is discussion-based and, at the most 
basic level, only requires a simple prompt to incorporate. These trends should be included 
from the pre-disaster stage mitigation strategies through the recovery stage. The authors 
found that most of the issues that arose are mitigatable through thorough and deliberate 
training (see Chapter IV Section C). 
4. How can the USAF use its current toolbox (training plans and task lists) to 
identify the necessary skill set in a CONUS HADR event, thereby 
enabling its members to better train and educate themselves in preparation 
for future events? 
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Appendix A contains a sample synthesized USAF contracting CFETP, and 
Appendix B has a sample USAF UJTL based on current USAF tools. By synthesizing the 
enlisted, civilian, and officer CFETPs and listing the required mission sets per the DOD, 
the USAF can provide the participants with specific expectations that are quantifiable, 
attainable, realistic, and time-based (Dausey et al., 2007). 
5. Which stakeholders should be taken into consideration during a CONUS 
HADR event?  
Chapter II’s literature review identified a multitude of potential stakeholders. At 
the very least, the local base’s stakeholders, such as the CES’s emergency management 
flight, the wing commander, and the CS, must be consulted. External stakeholders should 
include the regional FEMA coordinator, local and state representatives, and the appropriate 
USNORTHCOM SCO. The following is a list of potential stakeholders (not exhaustive): 
• Local Base (see Figure 4) 
• Wing Commander 
• Wing Staff Agency 
• Comptroller Squadron 
• Public Affairs 
• Mission Support Group 
• Communications Squadron 
• Civil Engineering Squadron 
• Emergency Management Flight  
• Firefighting Flight 
• Force Support Squadron 
• Medical Group  
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• Medical Support Squadron 
• Higher-level Organizations 
• United States Northern Command Senior Contract Official 
• Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Coordinator 
• External 
• Civil Air Patrol 
• National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
• Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
• State Emergency Operations Center 
• Local Emergency Operations Center 
6. What exercise objectives should be prioritized?  
The two most important trends identified were the use of advance contracts and the 
multitude of communication errors that can occur before, during, and after a disaster. 
Advance contracts can identify and maximize the country’s impressive supply chains, 
while improved communication has a plethora of secondary effects, such as improving 
planning through agency mission awareness, de-conflicting stakeholders’ priorities, and 
reducing repeated efforts consolidation of purchases.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides five recommendations that are based on Chapter IV’s 
findings. These recommendations are aligned explicitly to recently published strategic 
documents from the OMB, the USAF, and the DOD.  
1. Focus on communication and aligning training practices with the lead 
agency.  
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The HADR event within CONUS is unique within the DOD due to the lead agency 
being a different federal agency: FEMA. In the Responsible Contract Manager, by Cohen 
and Eimicke (2008), there is a specific emphasis on recognizing the use of networks to 
supplement the procurement method. The authors of this MBA report identified that the 
majority of active federal agencies within a CONUS HADR were not utilizing their 
networks effectively and that this cropped up continually in ESF #2: Communications. By 
aligning the training practices with the lead agency, the participants will begin aligning 
their mindset and actions to the agency in charge. Although JP 4-10 is extremely useful for 
military operations overseas, it may need to be tailored in order to maximize its utility 
within a CONUS HADR event. 
2. Incorporate the links to the different locations of advance contracts (i.e., 
GSA Advantage, Acquisition Gateway, AFICC SharePoint, etc.) and 
provide intuitive instructions to navigate and utilize those advance 
contracts. 
There has been a push from the OMB circulars M-13-02 (Zients, 2013) and M-19-
13 (Weichert, 2019) and the USAF Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting’s 2019 
strategic guidance, Air Force Contracting Flight Plan, Line of Effort 3, encouraging the 
use of advance contracts (Holt, 2019). In disasters, time is limited, and strategically 
utilizing the local supply chain is critical to success. Through advance contracts, the 
sourcing can be planned earlier on in the process, and contractors can be prepared to react 
in a disaster when they know which federal agencies will go to them first. This leads to 
Recommendation 3.  
3. Continue to build category management practices through additional 
spend analysis into the planned USAF disaster response. 
One of the critical tools within a successful category management strategy is 
strategic sourcing (Pandit & Marmanis, 2008). The FPDS–NG disaster databases are useful 
tools but may be incomplete. The USAF should invest in developing a central repository 
that supplements the FPDS–NG database, including all the individual unpublicized 
contract actions—such as government purchase card (GPC) purchases and SF44 PIIN logs. 
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This can also help validate the accuracy of the federal data. Between these two databases, 
the USAF can develop a better negotiating strategy with contractors capable of disaster 
response. This repository will help users to develop more accurate pricing, recognize 
appropriate advance contract coverage, and identify common purchasing strategies.  
4. Update the three USAF contracting CFETPs to either mimic the YTTM 
model or the deployment kits to provide personnel specific expectations. 
Within the SAF/AQC’s Line of Effort 1 is Objective 2’s guidance to “reimagine 
training and culture from initial skills through executive level” (Holt, 2019). The 
synthesized CONUS HADR CFET, which the authors have provided in Appendix A, 
incorporates the existing education training plans and enhances them per this guidance by 
infusing YTTM into the expectations. This layout provides the participants with a list of 
TOs to meet based on experience and rank expectations implicit within the USAF 
deployment job codes. Using this guide, a training manager could advise a lieutenant on 
studying to be a more effective planner at the 6- to 7-year mark of their career. This can 
potentially be developed into a DOD or federal procurement standard. 
5. Continue improving the AFICC SharePoint’s disaster section. 
Throughout the year of researching this project, the SharePoint site has improved 
for user navigation. Moving forward, AFICC should consider including two additional 
sources of information on the AFICC Expeditionary Operations Cell’s SharePoint. The 
first source of information is a comprehensive list of potential external stakeholders such 
as USNORTHCOM and FEMA. As disasters continue to increase in frequency (see 
Chapter II), the military’s budget will be further strained. An effective way of improving 
the effective use of a budget is to realize economies of scale through networking larger 
contracts with mission partners. Additionally, contracting has historically been relied upon 
to support the government’s overall objectives in lieu of increasing the government’s 
manpower. By improving our networking throughout federal agencies, we can leverage the 
federal government’s full power instead of “just a base.”  
The second source of information we recommend incorporating is an easy-to-
access AAR repository and a template for the minimum information for those AARs. We 
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found that the strengths and weaknesses were readily apparent in the USAF AARs we read; 
however, a PIIN log of purchases with contract type, dollar amount, brief description, and 
so on would be precious in identifying trends within the agency. We could also compare 
those PIIN logs to the FPDS–NG database to validate those databases’ accuracy for disaster 
strategic sourcing purposes.  
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The authors believe the following future research topics will be useful in improving 
the suggested TTX design. The areas include improving and analyzing the initial CFETP 
synthesis provided in Appendix A, improving disaster spend analysis, and interviewing 
leadership that are involved with CONUS HADR planning and/or individuals who have 
provided AARs for CONUS HADR disaster.  
1. Refinement of the Suggested CFETP Synthesis 
Currently, USAF contracting leadership has identified gaps in the training 
standards of the career field. Additional research areas that could greatly benefit the realms 
of disaster management within contracting would be the addition of executive level (i.e., 
YTTM’s third tier) task and subject level knowledge.  
2. Disaster Database Research (FPDS–NG) 
GSA currently maintains a treasure trove of disaster data within the FPDS–NG 
database. Trend analysis identifying methods of award and competition, procurement 
acquisition lead time (PALT), and Departement of Defense Activity Address Code 
(DoDAAC) management could potentially provide invaluable insight into how the DOD 
has managed spend in disasters, and additional strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat 
(SWOT) analysis could give excellent insight into successful and unsuccessful DOD 
methods. 
3. Interviews of Leadership in USNORTHCOM and FEMA 
King and McKay (2006) interviewed FEMA’s acquisition lead, which provided an 
exciting insight into the successes and failures of Hurricane Katrina. Additional interviews 
to capture Hurricane Michael lessons from the USAF perspective or FEMA’s leadership 
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perspectives moving forward in federally declared disasters should provide further insight 
into not only how but why the federal government has acted in specific ways. NPS should 
investigate creating a similar interview or reporting schedule to the GAO’s annual disaster 
report. NPS captures executive-level insight into a SWOT-type analysis to improve further 
the DOD’s ability to prepare, mitigate, and potentially prevent disasters.  
D. SUMMARY 
This project provided a TTX exercise design for a CONUS HADR event for the 
USAF in Appendix E. More importantly, it incorporated the DOD’s methodology with 
FEMA to create an adaptable framework that reduces confusion between the lead agency 
(FEMA) and the subordinate agency (DOD) in a CONUS disaster. It also provides a trend 
analysis from 104 AARs on disasters and lessons learned to inform the exercise. Although 
this exercise may not be the perfect solution, the authors hope that it improves the USAF’s 
contracting personnel’s capability to plan before a disaster to mitigate and reduce the 
impact of future disasters. Finally, the authors hope that FEMA and the DOD take note of 
the significant increase in disasters within our country and team together to optimize their 
ability to meet future threats. 
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APPENDIX A. SYNTHESIZED USAF CONTRACTING CFETP FOR 
A CONUS HADR EVENT 
Table 11. Sample Synthesized USAF Contracting CFETP for a CONUS 
HADR Event. Adapted from Applegate (2017), Bennett (2019), 
Conger (2016), and Yoder (2004). 
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APPENDIX B. SYNTHESIZED USAF UJTL FOR A CONUS HADR EVENT 
 

























APPENDIX C. FEMA, DOD, AFMAN 10–2502 BRIDGE 
Unfortunately, each of FEMA’s emergency support function (ESF) annexes are 
located in separate documents. The purpose of this Appendix is a potential way to help 
organize which organizations should be working together in order to meet the intent of 
each ESF as well as what the overall intent of each ESF is. This Appendix was referenced 
in Chapter IV Section C.  
 












1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Insert the Emergency Support Function (ESF) number. The titles are 
identical with the exception of ESF 5, which is Information and Planning 
for FEMA and Emergency Management for the USAF; ESF 7, which is 
Logistics for FEMA and Resource Support for the USAF; and ESF 14, 
which is Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure for FEMA and Long-
Term Community Recovery and Mitigation Responsibilities for the 
USAF.  
2. FEMA provides the scope of the ESF in the scope section of each annex. 
3. Each ESF provides potential missions for all of the potential stakeholders 
within its umbrella. This column should provide the DOD’s 
responsibilities as well as its subordinate agencies (i.e. USACE, DLA, 
USTRANSCOM, etc.). The DOD’s responsibilities normally lie within the 
support agencies section of each annex. ESF 3 and ESF 9, the DOD has 
responsibilities listed under the primary agency section as well as under 
the support agency section. 
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4. AFMAN 10–2502, Attachment 2 provides the squadron and the multiple 
missions that fall underneath the EOC’s primary. 
5. Under the FEMA ESF annexes’ first section are the coordinators and 
primary agency identifiers.  
6. Under the FEMA ESF annexes’ first section are the support agencies. 
7. For both 5 and 6, FEMA’s regional office should be able to provide points 
of contact in each support agency.  
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APPENDIX D. HURRICANE MICHAEL FPDS–NG AWARD AND 
MODIFICATION TIME LINE 
Table 12. Total Number of Signed DOD Contract Actions Per Day. Adapted 
from GSA (2020). 
Date Number of stand-alone awards 




11-Oct-18 0 1 0 
12-Oct-18 0 3 0 
13-Oct-18 0 1 0 
14-Oct-18 2 0 1 
15-Oct-18 1 2 0 
16-Oct-18 4 0 4 
17-Oct-18 0 1 1 
18-Oct-18 0 1 0 
19-Oct-18 0 1 0 
20-Oct-18 0 0 2 
21-Oct-18 0 0 0 
22-Oct-18 0 0 0 
23-Oct-18 2 1 2 
24-Oct-18 1 1 3 
25-Oct-18 2 1 2 
26-Oct-18 2 0 1 
27-Oct-18 0 0 0 
28-Oct-18 0 2 0 
29-Oct-18 0 4 2 
30-Oct-18 0 2 0 
31-Oct-18 0 0 0 
1-Nov-18 0 4 1 
2-Nov-18 0 0 0 
3-Nov-18 0 0 1 
4-Nov-18 0 0 0 
5-Nov-18 0 0 0 
6-Nov-18 0 0 1 
7-Nov-18 1 0 2 
8-Nov-18 0 0 0 
9-Nov-18 0 1 3 
10-Nov-18 1 1 0 
11-Nov-18 0 0 1 
12-Nov-18 0 0 1 
13-Nov-18 0 0 3 
14-Nov-18 1 1 5 
130 
Date Number of stand-alone awards 




15-Nov-18 1 0 0 
16-Nov-18 0 0 2 
17-Nov-18 0 0 0 
18-Nov-18 0 0 0 
19-Nov-18 0 1 2 
20-Nov-18 0 0 0 
21-Nov-18 0 0 1 
22-Nov-18 0 0 0 
23-Nov-18 0 0 1 
24-Nov-18 0 0 0 
25-Nov-18 0 0 1 
26-Nov-18 0 0 0 
27-Nov-18 2 0 3 
28-Nov-18 1 0 2 
29-Nov-18 0 0 6 
30-Nov-18 1 0 4 
 
Table 13. Total Number of Signed DOD Contract Actions per Month During 
Hurricane Michael. Adapted from GSA (2020). 
Month Total New Awards Total Task Orders Total Modifications 
Oct-18 Total 14 21 18 
Nov-18 Total 8 8 40 
Dec-18 Total 3 10 21 
Jan-19 Total 2 6 15 
Feb-19 Total 1 3 27 
Mar-19 Total 2 7 21 
Apr-19 Total 0 3 3 
Note. The first DOD contract action attributed to Hurricane Michael took place October 11, 2018. 
Take note that the majority of contract actions are in the post-award phase of contracting. After the 




Table 14. Hurricane Michael Time Line. Adapted from Berg et al. (2019) 
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2019).  
6 Oct 2020 • Tropical storm warning issued for Cuba. 
• Tropical storm watch issued for Mexico. 
7 Oct 2020 • Tropical storm warning issued for Mexico upgraded from storm 
watch. 
8 Oct 2020 • Tropical storm watch issued for Florida, Alabama, Mississippi. 
• Tropical storm warning issued for Alabama (upgraded from watch 
same day). 
• Hurricane watch issued to Florida (same time as tropical storm 
watch) and Alabama (same time as tropical storm warning). 
• Hurricane warning issued to Cuba (upgraded from tropical storm 
warning) and Florida (upgraded from hurricane watch same day).  
9 Oct 2020 • Tropical storm watch issued for Georgia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina. 
• Tropical storm warning issued for Cuba (downgraded from 
hurricane warning), Georgia (upgraded from storm watch), North 
Carolina (upgraded from storm watch), and South Carolina 
(upgraded from storm watch). 
• Tropical storm warning ended for Cuba and Mexico. 
• Hurricane watch ended for Alabama. 
10 Oct 2020 
 
• Tropical storm watch ended for Mississippi and areas of Florida.  
• Tropical storm warning ended for Alabama and areas of Florida. 
• Hurricane watch issued to Florida (same time as tropical storm 
watch) and Alabama (same time as tropical storm warning).  
• Hurricane warnings ended for specific areas of Florida. 
• Hurricane Michael makes landfall in Florida as a Category 5 
hurricane. 
11 Oct 2020 • Tropical storm warning ended for Georgia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina. 
• Hurricane warning ended for Florida. 
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APPENDIX E. USAF CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN FOR 
CONTRACTING 
This appendix provides a simple TTX design geared towards USAF contracting; 
however, it should apply to any contracting office within the DOD with the exceptions of 
any AFIs which would be the sister service (i.e. Navy, Army, Marine, or Coast Guard 
equivalent). Additionally, there is a supplemental power point file that provides the 
accompanying slides for this suggested design.  
A. DESIGN 
The following section breaks down a sample design for a TTX that provides initial 
background and discussions that frame the problem of a disaster environment, which leads 
into a review of the current concept of operations that is maintained by the emergency 
management flight per AFI 10–2501 Emergency Management Program (2020). This can 
be further refined into a TTX that simulates the disaster from notification (Day 0) through 
disaster end and recovery start. As discussed before, it is broken out into pre-disaster, 
disaster, and post-disaster phases. The supplemental file CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN 
provides the pre-disaster format. 
 Pre-Disaster 
This stage of the TTX should provide the users with initial instructions, the 
commander’s intent, an informed set of objectives and expected capabilities, an estimated 
schedule, and a method to potentially achieve success. Upon providing the users these 
documents, the following sections will help build towards running an actual HADR 
exercise. The purpose of this TTX is to ensure that the CONS is as best prepared as it can 
be to meet its base’s requirements while taking into consideration the impact of 
procurement on other federal organizations and the local community’s ability to recover.  
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a. Commander’s Intent and Introduction (Supplemental File CONUS 
HADR TTX DESIGN – Module 1 – Block 0 – Introduction) 
The commander’s intent should be derived from the base’s local concept of support. 
The intent should be first to reasonably mitigate dangers to the Airmen and families and, 
after disaster occurrence, to ensure their safety. The secondary goals should fall in line with 
each ESF’s priorities. Hopefully, the intent includes preparation to support the local 
community as well as any tasks delegated from USNORTHCOM and FEMA. The authors 
do recommend using an existing commanders intent from any recent hurricane event that 
impacted a USAF base. 
b. METL (See Section B) 
The METL is derived from Chapter IV’s analysis, as well as the Synthesized 
CFETP (Appendix A) and the Synthesized UJTL. The Module 1 – Block 6 Gap Analysis 
also will provide an end result of a list of potential requirements tied to the mission sets of 
each stakeholder. This can be used in order to create an excellent METL for the disaster 
and post-disaster phases of a TTX. 
c. Exercise Schedule (See Section C) 
The sample schedule provided in Section C is designed to take roughly 40 hours (1 
workweek) to complete. It is relatively simple to break apart and split over a year. 
Hopefully, it is built such that it can be paired with local base exercises in order to 
maximize its usefulness and impact. Depending on the base, these base exercises may be 
occurring on an annual basis, which contracting can coordinate with the emergency 
management flight to improve the TTX’s usefulness and realism. The heaviest portion of 
work is done during the pre-disaster phase in order to better mitigate and prepare for the 
chaos of the disaster.  
d. Stakeholder Analysis (Supplemental File CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN 
– Module 1 – Block 1 – Stakeholder Analysis)  
The purpose of this section is to expand the contracting personnel’s mindset of the 
Air Force wing or base as the sole focus and to start including the other interests at play 
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during a disaster. We recommend using the AFMAN 10–2501 along with the FEMA 
NRF’s ESF Annexes 1–15 to help identify the multiple federal agencies that may be 
involved with recovery in order to minimize duplicative efforts and de-conflict supply 
chains. This will become more apparent throughout the market research and trend analysis 
topics that identify how these stakeholders may influence the base’s procurement strategies 
moving forward. Furthermore, by filtering up to FEMA, which is the lead agency, the 
USAF contracting personnel can attempt to align their procurement strategies with the lead 
federal agency. 
e. Mission Analysis (Supplemental File CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN – 
Module 1 – Block 2 – Mission Analysis) 
The purpose of this section is to push the “Mission Focus Business Leader” mindset 
espoused by the new USAF procurement leadership (Holt, 2019). The contracting 
participants will review each ESF’s mission sets, along with the potential participants 
within each, which is informed by the stakeholder analysis. Additionally, reviewing the 
FPDS–NG recent disaster databases that provide detailed purchase logs of federal spend 
can help support those anticipated requirements through data. 
f. Market Research (Supplemental File CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN – 
Module 1 – Block 3 – Market Research & Supplemental File CONUS 
HADR TTX DESIGN – Module 1 – Block 4 – Advance Contracts) 
The purpose of this section is to inform the gap analysis that takes place at the end 
of the pre-disaster phase. First, we recommend identifying the CONS’s current contract 
portfolio for disaster readiness, which includes reviewing key disaster contracts, such as 
construction, and communication-centric contracts. The review should identify whether the 
contracts are built to function during a disaster, and—if not—whether they can be modified 
to function or whether a new contract or agreement will need to be established. Second, we 
recommend identifying available advance contracts throughout the federal government 
including GSA Advantage, Acquisition Gateway, AFICC SharePoint, and FEMA’s online 
advance contract listing. This attempts to resolve the misuse of advance contracts identified 
in our analysis. Last, we recommend reviewing the FPDS–NG databases for recent 
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disasters in order to identify utilized IDIQs and contracting methods and to identify 
whether the contracts were locally sourced or not. 
g. Contract Authority, Funding, and Legal Review (Supplemental File 
CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN – Module 1 – Block 5 – Finance, 
Thresholds, Laws) 
The purpose of this section is to review the applicable laws, funding streams, and 
authorities and to assess how decision thresholds, such as the simplified acquisition 
threshold, change. For many, this will be a quick review; however, it is important that 
everyone knows where to find the information as these rules do change over time. 
h. Trend Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to identify problem areas that may be mitigated 
through the TTX process. For example, knowing that communications are a consistent 
problem and that communication can mitigate further issues, reviewing LMR familiarity 
or other alternative communication standards can only help in the long run. This section 
should take a significant amount of time, as the consolidation of the many different 
resources and the subsequent review is a slow process. Fortunately, we already reviewed 
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will not be required as more disasters occur. 
i. Gap Analysis (Supplemental File CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN – 
Module 1 – Block 6 – Gap Analysis) 
The conclusion of this pre-disaster section is the gap analysis. It takes all of the 
previous sections and synthesizes the data to determine what the team believes they are 
capable of accomplishing if the disaster were to occur that day—versus what the team 
believes they need to be capable of accomplishing. Furthermore, it identifies the many 
stakeholders and how to contact them. It is unlikely that all problems can be resolved at 
this stage, and risk mitigation steps should be utilized to the maximum extent practical. An 
example is identifying that funds are not available for recovery of the airfield today, but 
the squadron could create a BPA for asphalt delivery during a disaster through companies 
137 
that are registered in the VOAD database. The majority of the analysis of this MBA project 
informed the trend analysis and gap analysis.  
j. Review 
A key component of our recommended TTX design is the built-in AARs that will 
be sent to the appropriate office at AFICC. The AAR should capture the strengths and 
weaknesses of the TTX to teach and prepare the participants. The AAR should reference 
CFETP and UJTL expectations when describing participant abilities. The AAR should also 
review whether the lessons captured the intent described in each introduction. Last, the 
AAR should provide ample area for suggestions on improvement in regards to additional 
information or already covered material.  
 Disaster (Day 0–Day 6) 
The 6-day estimate is based on Hurricane Michael’s time line, which is provided in 
Table 14 in Appendix D. This section focuses primarily on reviewing the current local 
base’s plan, which could be performed by running through the Module 1 – Block 6 – Gap 
Analysis a second time with all relevant plans—including internal plans, such as the local 
base continuity of operations (CONOPS), or external plans, such as OPLANs of the 
USNORTHCOM SCO. Last, this phase should also review the CCO kits, including the 
physical kits and deployable personnel. 
a. Concept of Support and/or CONOPS Review (Supplemental File CONUS 
HADR TTX DESIGN – Module 2 – Block 1 – CONOPS & Supplemental 
File CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN – Module 2 – Block 2 – CCO Kits) 
The participants would be required to review the current base’s CONOPS and 
continuity of support (CONSUP) in order to ascertain two primary objectives:  
• Is contracting support integrated into the plan per the JP 4-10 guidance?  
• What objectives may be required to prepare for and recover from a 
disaster?  
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b. Potential External Requests for Support Review (USNORTHCOM) 
After reviewing the base’s concept of support, it is important to reach out to the 
external stakeholders identified in the pre-disaster section in order to appropriately prepare 
for potential support. These stakeholders include the local governor and their EOC as well 
as USNORTHCOM. Our findings indicate that due to poor communication habits, there 
are multiple doubled efforts as well as conflicting priorities all in the same area. Reviewing 
the stakeholders within the ESFs, the contracting personnel can begin to recognize the 
potential scope of responsibility beyond that of the base.  
c. Review 
The purpose of this section is to capture information in regards to potential 
additional or superfluous CONOPS and CONSUP lessons and to anticipate potential 
misunderstandings from external stakeholders. This includes assumptions of level of 
support, who the key points of contact are, and unavailable networks despite the ESF 
descriptions.  
 Post-Disaster (Recovery Begins)  
This section is focused on which priorities the base has and how the CONS can 
meet those priorities. In our recommendations for further research, we encourage a review 
of the FPDS–NG disaster database in order to build a more accurate list of common 
purchases and how they have been awarded historically. The gap analysis from the pre-
disaster phase, along with the review of the CONSUP, can inform how quickly responses 
can be achieved. During this TTX, if appropriate mitigation steps are not taken in order to 
address the trend analysis, the training manager can incorporate those trends into the 
injects. The first sample inject that comes to mind is based on whether the contracting team 
has created and briefed how purchase requests are handled. Based on our analysis, doubled 
purchases were a common problem. Therefore, injects that mimic doubled purchases and 
partially completed purchase requests can simulate the disorganization inherent with a 
disaster. 
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B. MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (HSEEP MASTER SCENARIO 
EVENTS LIST) 
The training team should utilize the synthesized UJTL in Appendix B and the 
synthesized CFETP in Appendix A to create a list of appropriate tasks to validate their 
participants’ abilities to fulfill their potential contracting force packages (i.e., XFFK1, 
XFFK3, etc.). Furthermore, if the training team wants to incorporate the FEMA and/or 
DHS into their TTX, they should know to state this creation as an MSEL instead of their 
acronym, METL. Last, the gap analysis within the sample exercise in the supplemental 
section can provide ample examples of potential requirements.  
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C. EXERCISE SCHEDULE SAMPLE 
The purpose of this exercise schedule is to allow appropriate scheduling and 
planning in order to fit this exercise into the overall training schedule. The times are based 
on the author’s best estimates and may vary greatly due to experience of the team. 
Additionally, the timing may need to be shifted if the local contracting squadron is able to 
convince outside organizations to be involved. 
Table 15. Sample Exercise Schedule 
Hours Cumulative 
time 
Phase Topic of discussion 
1 1 hour Pre-Disaster Introduction 
4 5 hours Pre-Disaster Stakeholder Analysis 
3 8 hours Pre-Disaster Mission Analysis 
5 13 hours Pre-Disaster Market Research 
4 17 hours Pre-Disaster Advance Contract 
Identification 
1 18 hours Pre-Disaster Disaster Law and policy 
review 
5 23 hours Pre-Disaster Gap Analysis 
1 24 hours Pre-Disaster AAR 
7 31 hours Disaster CONSUP review 
1 32 hours Disaster AAR 
5 37 hours Post-Disaster Injects 










D. TTX SUGGESTED DOCUMENT LIST 
This table provides the suggested documents for the TTX. This MBA project 
provides rough drafts of the AAR, Exercise Schedule, Gap Analysis Tool,  Mission 
Essential task List, MRAC tool, and the SLA Tool. The CONOPS and OPLAN should be 
provided by the local Emergency Management flight or the parent agency. 
Table 16. TTX Suggested Document List 
Document name Description 
After Action Report 
(AAR) 
A sample is provided in the supplemental files labeled as 
After Action Report Sample. The parent organization should 
attempt to standardize the format and keep a database of the 
lessons learned and feedback. 
Continuity of 
Operations (CONOPS) 
The local base’s CONOPS should be used or, if not 
available, a sample from the parent agency. If there is not an 
available CONOPS at the local base, this is an excellent 
time to develop one.  
Exercise Schedule A sample is provided in Section C in this Appendix.  
Gap Analysis Tool A sample is provided in the supplemental files labeled as 
Gap Analysis Tool (Block 6) Excel file. This file is 
designed for use with Module 1 – Block 6. 
Mission Essential Task 
List 




A sample is provided in the supplemental files labeled as 
MRAC Tool (Block 3,4) Excel file. This file is designed for 
use with Module 1 – Block 3 – Market Research and Block 
4 – Advance Contract.  
OPLANs The parent agencies, along with the local base, may have 
additional operational plans in case of a disaster. The more 
plans that can be incorporated throughout the TTX, the 
better the chance of success for each plan upon enaction. 
The OPLANs are especially important in the Block 6 – Gap 








Sample provided in the supplemental files in the SLA Tool 
Excel file. This file is designed for use with Module 1 – 





The section provides the supplemental files along with descriptions for each file. 
The supplemental files are referenced throughout Appendix E with Supplemental File B: 
CONUS HADR TTX Design PowerPoint File being the actual suggested pre-disaster 
portion of the exercise. The additional supplemental files are designed to complement the 
PowePoint, as described in Appendix E.  
A. CONUS HADR TTX DESIGN POWERPOINT FILE 
This PowerPoint file contains the pre-disaster layout based on the suggestions from 
this MBA project. The other supplemental files are designed to augment the PowerPoint’s 
functionality through worksheets such as the Gap Analysis Tool, the MRAC Tool, and the 
SLA Tool, while the sample synthesized HADR CFETP Excel file and Appendix B are 
provided to help inform the TTX’s objectives to align the requirements. 
B. STAKEHOLDER LIST ASSESSMENT (BLOCK 1, 2) TOOL EXCEL FILE 
The SLA tool is designed to be used with the CONUS HADR TTX Design 
PowerPoint file. This provides a worksheet to fill out during the Block 1 – Stakeholder 
Analysis and Block 2 – Mission Analysis of Module 1. The output of this tool is used to 
help identify the internal base stakeholders and their missions along with additional federal 
agencies and external mission partners with their missions. The purpose is to understand 
the disaster environment in terms of potentially competing and/or collaborative mission 
sets in order to maximize the utility of every federal dollar spent.  
C. MARKET RESEARCH ADVANCE CONTRACT (MRAC) TOOL (BLOCK 
3, 4) EXCEL FILE 
This tool is designed to be used with the CONUS HADR TTX Design PowerPoint 
file. This provides a worksheet to fill out during Block 3 – Market Research and Block 4 – 
Advance Contract of Module 1. The output of this tool can be printed into an easy-to-use 
binder for the home squadron as well as any incoming deployers. 
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D. GAP ANALYSIS TOOL (BLOCK 6) EXCEL FILE 
This tool is designed to be used with the CONUS HADR TTX Design PowerPoint 
file. This provides a worksheet to fill out during the Block 6 – Gap Analysis. Upon 
completion, the output from this file provides invaluable insight into the abilities of the 
CCO team, the abilities of the squadron to meet current plans, and the gaps in those 
capabilities to meet potential demands. 
E. AFTER ACTION REPORT SAMPLE WORD DOCUMENT 
This document provides a sample AAR for use by the agencies to ensure a 
consistent format. It mimics the layout of the supplemental CONUS HADR TTX Design 
PowerPoint file. This document is designed to provide the lead agency with a feedback 
loop in order to improve the TTX and to identify trends in strengths and deficiencies in 
order to improve training focuses in the future.  
F. SAMPLE SYNTHESIZED HADR CFETP EXCEL FILE 
This supplemental file provides the user with an easy-to-use and sortable Excel file 
that can be updated as new CFETPs are released. The main purpose of providing a sample 
is to give the agency guidance on how to minimize the confusion for local training 
managers and co-workers when identifying the required knowledge sets to meet the intent 
of ordering officers, leveraging officers, and integrated planners per YTTM. This design 
also provides a deliberate growth from year 0 to senior levels in line with General Holt’s 
(2019) line of effort 1, objective 2, “reimagine training and culture from initial skills 
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